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NOTE,
FORECLOSURE MADNESS:

USING MORTGAGE DECELERATION TO
EVADE THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
1. INTRODUCTION

It was 1988 when Lilla Roberts moved into her small, two-story
house in Jamaica, Queens.1 To an outside observer, it looked no different
than any other house in the neighborhood: "part brick, part faded gray
siding, with a red awning out front and a large backyard." 2 But for
Ms. Roberts, this was not just any house.3 Aside from the work that she
put into it and the use she made of it-the basement that she renovated,
the rotting wood that she replaced, the attic that she rented out, and the
garden that she maintained in the backyard-she spent nearly two
decades in her home developing "her life's memories." 4 But all the
indelible experiences that come with long-term home ownership, and
everything that Lilla worked her entire life for, would ultimately be put
on the line.5 In 2007, the seventy-year-old Lilla Roberts suffered a
"temporary setback" which caused her to undergo one of the most
painful experiences of her life: home foreclosure.6
After experiencing serious financial difficulties, Ms. Roberts found
herself unable to afford her monthly mortgage payments. 7 "Given her
situation-steady income, a history of reliability-you would think that
she would be a perfect candidate for a mortgage modification."8 But her
lender, Bank of America, did not see it that way.9 Instead of giving
1.
at B 1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Joe Nocera, A Happy Ending to a Raw, but Common, Tale, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2010,
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Ms. Roberts a second chance, the bank promptly foreclosed on the
property and assigned it to Fannie Mae.' ° Ms. Roberts only became
aware of the foreclosure when she discovered Fannie Mae's eviction
notice taped to her front door.11
Lilla Roberts's story is not unusual. 2 After the turn of the century,
widespread changes in the mortgage lending industry combined with a
3
lack of government regulation triggered a national foreclosure crisis,'
which in turn caused an estimated ten million homeowners across the
nation to lose their homes. 14 After the crisis began in 2007, banks
quickly began foreclosing on mortgages and assigning them to various
third-party loan servicers. 15 Many of those mortgages underwent several
assignments before ending up in the hands of powerhouse foreclosure
firms that specialized in churning out tens of thousands of foreclosure
cases every year. 6 Some of those firms, along with the nation's largest
financial institutions that they represented, gained notoriety for their
improper handling of foreclosure cases.' 7 Due in large part to their
misconduct, including widespread fraud and malpractice, many
8
foreclosure cases were ultimately discontinued or dismissed,' and a
growing number of mortgages are now uncollectable due to the

10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See Emily Badger, How the Housing Crisis Left the US. More Racially Segregated,
WASH. POST, May 10, 2015, at A14; Laura Kusisto, After Foreclosure, Fewer Buy Homes,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 21,2015, at A2.
13. See Barry Ritholtz, What Caused the Financial Crisis? The Big Lie Goes Viral, WASH.
POST, Nov. 5, 2011, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/what-cased-the-financial-crisisBut see
the-big-lie-goes-vira/2011/10/31/gIQAXISOqMstory.html?utmterm-.a7569ef94110.
infra note 86 and accompanying text (explaining that there is sharp disagreement over the extent to
which government deregulation of Wall Street was to blame).
14. See Badger, supra note 12; Kusisto, supranote 12.
15. See Megan Wachspress et al., Comment, In Defense of "Free Houses", 125 YALE L.J.
1115, 1119-20 (2016); see also Allan L. Hill & Nickolas Karavolas, A Note on Mortgage
Assignments in New York, LAW360 (Jan. 25, 2017, 11:03 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/
880759/a-note-on-mortgage-assignments-in-new-york (explaining that the commonality of
mortgage assignments is due in part to "the waiver of a portion of tax imposed for recording such
mortgage [assignment]").
16. See Peter Lattman, ForeclosureFirm Steven J. Baum to Close Down, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
21, 2011, 2:51 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/11/21/foreclosure-firm-steven-j-baum-toclose-down; see also Gretchen Morgenson, New York Subpoenas 2 Foreclosure-RelatedFirms,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2011, at B1 (explaining that one such firm, Steven J. Baum, P.C., once handled
roughly forty percent of New York's foreclosure cases and has filed more than 50,000 foreclosure
cases in New York throughout the last decade). For more on these foreclosure firms, see infra Part
I.B.
17. Lattman, supra note 16; Morgenson, supra note 16, at Bi, B4; infra Part I.B.
18. See infra Parts I.B, II.A-B.
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expiration of the statute of limitations. 9 If the original borrower is still
in possession of the house, they are eligible to gain title to the house for
"free." 2 Even if the original borrower no longer lives in the house, their
debt can now be extinguished.21
Confronting this problem, lenders have developed a novel argument
to revive these dead foreclosure cases.22 This argument posits that, when
the prior foreclosure action was discontinued, the acceleration of the
mortgage-the triggering event for the accrual of the statute of
limitations-was revoked.2 3 In foreclosure parlance, this concept is
known as "deceleration., 24 In the absence of controlling precedent from
the New York appellate courts,25 the lower courts have split on this
issue, with some holding in favor of the lenders 26 and others in favor of
the borrowers.2 ' Allowing lenders to revive these claims, which would
have otherwise expired under the statute of limitations, poses serious
consequences, including: (1) the courts will continue to be bogged down
with languishing cases with questionable merit; (2) the revival of these
19. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(4) (McKinney 2018) (providing for a six-year statute of
limitations); Saini v. Cinelli Enters., Inc., 733 N.Y.S.2d 824, 826 (App. Div. 2001) (noting that the
statute of limitations on a foreclosure action "runis] six years from the due date for each unpaid
installment or the time the mortgagee is entitled to demand full payment, or when the mortgage has
been accelerated by a demand or an action is brought" (citations omitted)); Wachspress et al., supra
note 15, at 1117-18, 1121.
20. Wachspress et al., supra note 15, at 1121. However, even though courts are required in
these cases by res judicata and "the state law's treatment of acceleration clauses ...to grant
homeowners 'free houses,"' many courts have refrained from doing so. Id.
21. See N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1501(4) (McKinney 2009); BSD 265, LLC v. HSBC
Bank USA N.A., No. 504656/16, 2017 WL 2778454, at *5-8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 27, 2017).
22. Andrew J. Bernhard, Feature, Deceleration:Restarting the ExpiredStatute of Limitations
in Mortgage Foreclosures,88 FLA. B.J. 31, 31 (2014); see infra text accompanying notes 128-3 1.
23. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 943 N.Y.S.2d 540, 542 (App. Div. 2012) (citations
omitted); BSD 265, LLC, 2017 WL 2778454, at *5-8.
24. Bernhard, supra note 22, at 31 ("Deceleration is the act of undoing a mortgage note's
acceleration and the accrual of the limitations period to retum the lending arrangement to status quo
ante-an installment agreement maturing in the distant future.").
25. BSD 265, LLC, 2017 WL 2778454, at *7 (acknowledging that there is no controlling
authority on this issue); Laura M. Greco & Mitra P. Singh, NY's Statute of Limitations and
Mortgage Foreclosures: How to Revoke Acceleration, N.Y.L.J. (Aug. 8, 2016),
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/almlD/1202764328981/?slretum=20180007195026 ("No
appellate court has weighed in on whether a voluntary discontinuance is sufficient to revoke
acceleration of the debt.").
26. See, e.g., U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Deochand, No. 702859/16, slip op. at 4-5 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Mar. 1, 2017) (holding that the voluntary discontinuance of a foreclosure action operates as a
revocation of the acceleration of a mortgage, and allowing a subsequent foreclosure action to be
brought by the same lender against the same borrower over the same mortgage, notwithstanding the
statute of limitations); U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Wongsonadi, No. 703762/2015, 2017 WL 1333442,
at *2, *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 5, 2017) (same).
27. See, e.g., BSD 265, LLC, 2017 WL 2778454, at *7-8 (holding that the voluntary
discontinuance of a foreclosure action, without more, does not revoke a mortgage acceleration).
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mortgages will create title issues that could forestall the free transfer of
property, a basic tenet of property ownership; (3) such property will be
burdened with title issues for a longer period of time than necessary; and
(4) abandoned houses will continue to blight neighborhoods across the
state, a consequence the New York State Legislature has already
legislation to prevent
attempted to address by passing comprehensive
28
disrepair.
into
falling
from
abandoned homes
This Note argues that mortgage lenders and loan servicers should
not be allowed to bypass the statute of limitations by showing only that a
29
prior foreclosure action was discontinued or dismissed. Part II begins
3°
by examining the primary causes of the 2007 home foreclosure crisis.
It then explains how banks, loan servicers, and large foreclosure law
firms engaged in widespread fraud and malpractice, resulting in the
discontinuances and dismissals of many foreclosure cases throughout
New York.31 Part III starts by explaining what the statute of limitations
is, and how the statute of limitations, along with many of the other
foreclosure rules of procedure, were designed to protect homeowners'
property interests.3 2 This Part then discusses lenders' recent efforts to
use deceleration to revive many of the foreclosure cases which would
33
otherwise be time-barred by the statute of limitations. Part IV analyzes
the public policy implications of allowing deceleration to reset the
statute of limitations, and it proceeds to argue: (1) a rule allowing a
voluntary discontinuance or dismissal, without more, to reset the statute
of limitations would be catastrophic to New York's courts, its
neighborhoods, and its housing market; and (2) that such a rule would be
wholly inconsistent with New York's legislatively established public
policy.3 4 Part IV then proposes an amendment to Article 13 of
New York's Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law to prevent
lenders, their successors and assignees, from evading the statute of
limitations; to streamline foreclosure actions; and to further the goal that
real property situated throughout the state is put to the best
possible use.35

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See infra Part IV.A for a discussion on each of these public policy concerns.
See infra Part IV.A-B.
See infra Part IA.
See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part HI.A.
See infra Part BI.B.
See infra Part 1V.A.
See infra Part fV.B.
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II.

THE CAUSES OF THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS AND ITS
UNRELENTING EFFECTS

Not so long ago, the national housing market was markedly
different than it is today-a mortgage would be issued by a single lender
to an individual borrower who would then make payments on that
mortgage directly to the lender.36 But alas, the mortgage industry is no
longer that simple.37 This Part describes this transformation and answers
the question: how did the mortgage industry go from what it was to what
it is today?38 Subpart A provides an overview of the events that triggered
the mortgage meltdown, 39 while Subpart B describes how banks,
servicers, and some of the largest foreclosure law firms responded to it. 40
A.

The ForeclosureCrisis: History Still in the Making

For nearly a century prior to the foreclosure crisis, mortgage
lending was considered by most banks as one of the "least risky"
practices they could be a part of.4 1 Lenders would loan money to a
borrower in the form of a mortgage and then sell the mortgage to Fannie
Mae, a shareholder-owned company, or Freddie Mac, a privately owned
company, both of which were created by Congress "to provide liquidity,
stability and affordability to the mortgage market. '4 By the midnineties, many of these mortgages were securitized by banks, a process
which involves consolidating the mortgages and then selling them to
other investors for resale to the public in the form of securities.4 3
36. MARK ZANDI, FINANCIAL SHOCK: GLOBAL PANIC AND GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS-How
WE GOT HERE AND WHAT MUST BE DONE TO Fix IT 11 (updated ed. 2009).
37. Id.
38. See infra Part l.A-B.
39. See infra Part H.A.
40. See infra Part II.B.
41. ZANDI, supra note 36, at1.
42. About Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,

FEDERAL HOUSING

FINANCE

AGENCY,

https://www.fhfa.gov/SupervisionRegulation/FannieMaeandFreddieMac/Pages/About-Fannie-Mae--Freddie-Mac.aspx (last visited Aug. 23, 2018); accord About Us, FREDDIE MAC,
http://www.freddiemac.com/about (last visited Aug. 23, 2018); Who We Are, FANNIE MAE,
http://www.fanniemae.com/portal/about-fim/who-we-are.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2018).
43. Wachspress et al., supra note 15, at 1118-19; Gary Anderson, How to Assign Blame for
the
Housing
Crisis,
BUSINESS
INSIDER
(Oct.
17,
2011,
7:32
AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/how-to-assign-blame-for-the-housing-crisis-201 1-10
("[S]ecuritization can be traced to Basel 2 in 1998."); Steve Denning, Lest We Forget: Why We had
a Financial Crisis, FORBES, (Nov. 22, 2011, 11:28 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
stevedenning/2011/11/22/5086/#774b52b8f92f ("The Glass-Steagall legislation ... was repealed in
1998. This allowed banks... to engage in highly risky business," including mortgage securitization
by regular banks and investment banks.). When a security is backed by a mortgage, it can also be
called a "mortgage-backed security." Mortgage-BackedSecurity, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1561
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Through securitization, investors routinely "flood[ed] the markets with
toxic assets while simultaneously obscuring just how bad those assets
were." 4 In 2007, these practices came to a head when homeowners
45
suddenly began defaulting on their mortgages in record numbers. It
seemed as though, in the blink of an eye, the mortgage industry went
47
from booming to imploding." Of course, this is an oversimplification.
Traditionally, prime mortgage-backed securities were considered
such a safe investment that many of those securities were given an
"AAA" rating, the most creditworthy rating." Prime mortgages were
considered safe investments because they were only given to
creditworthy borrowers. 49 In contrast, subprime mortgages were
considered riskier investments because they were given to borrowers
with a poor credit history, and subprime interest rates were substantially
higher to compensate for the increased risk.5" In 2007, the Federal
Reserve lowered the discount rate, the rate at which banks borrow
money from the Federal Reserve overnight.5 1 This lowered interest rates
across all sectors of the national economy and greatly contributed to
mortgage-backed securities receiving lower yield rates.52 The resulting
(10th ed. 2014) ("The cash flow from these securities depends on principal and interest payments
from the pool of mortgages.").
HELENE
ASSEMBLYWOMAN
&
CONFERENCE
DEMOCRATIC
44. INDEPENDENT
WEINSTEIN, STATE OF THE FORECLOSURE

CRISIS: THE ONGOING NEED FOR HOMEOWNER

DEFENSE 1 (2017), https://www.nysenate.gov/sites/default/files/foreclosure prevention-whitepaper
.pdf [hereinafter INDEPENDENT DEMOCRATIC CONFERENCE].
45. SeeZANDI,supranote36,at 175-78.
46. See Denning, supra note 43 (noting that, in the early 2000's, the mortgage industry had
experienced "an apparent boom" from the low interest rates, which "caused a spiral in anything
priced in dollars (i.e., oil, gold) or credit (i.e., housing) or liquidity driven (i.e., stocks)").
47. See, e.g., Ritholtz, supra note 13 (addressing the popular misconception that the blame
lies primarily on Congress for triggering or failing to prevent the foreclosure crisis, and describing
various factors that contributed to the crisis).
48. AAA, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/aaa.asp (last visited Aug. 23,
2018); Denning, supra note 46; Ritholtz, supra note 13 (explaining that credit-rating agencies such
as Fitch, Moody's, and S&P claimed that mortgage-backed securities were "as safe as U.S.
Treasurys" and gave those securities an AAA rating, which fund managers relied on after
conducting little if any due diligence on their own).
49. Prime, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/prime.asp (last visited Aug.
23, 2018).
50. JOHN E. MARTHINSEN, MANAGING IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: DEMYSTIFYING
INTERNATIONAL MACROECONOMICS 685 (2d ed. 2015); High-Yield Bonds, FIDELITY,

https://www.fidelity.com/fixed-income-bonds/individual-bonds/high-yield-bonds (last visited Aug.
23, 2018); Subprime, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/subprime.asp (last
visited Aug. 23, 2018).
51. Discount Rate, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/discountrate.asp
(last visited Aug. 23, 2018); FedLowers DiscountRate to Calm Markets, NPR (Aug. 17, 2007, 9:00
AM),http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=12866844.
52. See What are the Implications of a Low FederalFunds Rate, INVESTOPEDIA (Mar. 27,
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low interest rates led homeowners to apply for mortgages in
increasing numbers.5 3
At the time, Wall Street was the envy of virtually all financial
systems abroad.54 Wall Street investors were cognizant of this, and when
they saw a potentially lucrative opportunity with seemingly low risks,
they did not hesitate to take it. 55 Due to the low interest rates, many
investors turned to high-yield mortgage-backed securities.56 As these
securities became more popular, there were not enough prime mortgages
to securitize. 57 To make up the difference, banks began bundling
subprime
mortgages-which,
again,
were considered
risky
investments-together with prime mortgages, claiming the bundled
securities were as safe an investment as the purely prime mortgagebacked securities. 58 The banks then sold those bundled securities to
global investors. 59 "In many communities, houses were being traded like
stocks, bought and sold purely on the speculation that they would
continue to go up" in price. 60 And they did go up, for a time. 6' The
increase in property prices made it easier for homeowners to refinance
their mortgages, and like clockwork, homeowners across the country
began to do just that.62 Because of the large demand for mortgagebacked securities, it became extremely profitable to originate
mortgages.63 Subprime mortgages in particular were highly gainful for
lenders, who "earn[ed] yield spread premiums for [these] loans" and
2015, 12:11 PM), http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/032715/what-are-implications-lowfederal-funds-rate.asp.
53.
54.
55.
56.

See ZANDI, supra note 36, at 81-82.
See id
See id.
Denning, supra note 46 ("This market was dominated by non-bank originators exempt

from most regulations.").
57. See Ryan Barnes, The Fuel that Fed the Subprime Meltdown, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/07/subprime-overview.asp
(last visited Aug. 23, 2018);
Underwater Mortgage,
INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/07/subprimeoverview.asp (last visited Aug. 23, 2018).
58. Id.

59. See MARTHINSEN, supra note 50, at 682 (noting that the global investors were unaware of
how risky these investments were).
60. ZANDI, supra note 36, at 5.

61

Id.

62.

Id.; Alain Sherter, Did Home Refinancing Boom Trigger the Financial Crisis?, CBS

NEWS (Oct. 6, 2009, 4:15 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/did-home-refinancing-boomtrigger-the-financial-crisis (explaining that the rising costs of houses made it easier for homeowners
to refinance their mortgages, which in turn caused "a $1.5 trillion loss in the housing market").
63. Barnes, supranote 57; see also Tr. for the Certificate Holders of the Merrill Lynch Mortg.
Inv'rs, Inc. Mortg. Pass-Through Certificate, Series 1999-Cl v. Love Funding Corp., 556 F.3d 100,
102 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that mortgage-backed securities are "held by Wall Street banks in an
approximate amount of $100 billion" (citations omitted)).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2018

7

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 4 [2018], Art. 10

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1453

therefore had strong incentives to seek out willing borrowers.6 4 Banks
were actively encouraged to originate as many mortgages as possible,
even without proof of income or a down payment.6 5
As a growing number of homeowners applied to refinance their
loans, many of them conspired with their lenders to "fudge or lie on loan
applications," secure in the belief that the "appreciating property values
would make it all right in the end."66 Lenders received even greater
profits from this refinancing in the form of fees, which further
incentivized investment bankers to create increasingly elaborate and
profitable securities that enabled the rapid expansion of the nation's
housing markets.67 This combination of securitizing subprime mortgages
and selling those mortgages to overseas investors made financial
calamity all but inevitable. 68 Yet, few of these actors were able to
comprehend the risks of subprime mortgage securitization until the
meltdown struck.6 9
By the middle of 2006, home sales began to stagnate, and default
rates began to climb, making mortgage-backed securities less attractive
to investors.70 This lack of demand for mortgage-backed securities
caused housing prices to plummet.7 This in turn caused borrowers to
begin defaulting on their mortgages, which led housing prices to further
depreciate, which prompted more borrowers to default.7 2 The
skyrocketing number of borrowers defaulting on their mortgages
produced a sharp increase in the number of home foreclosures and
vacant houses on the market.73 The increase in the foreclosure rate
further decreased the demand for homes, which further decreased
64. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URB. DEV., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE ROOT CAUSES OF
THE FOREcLOSuRE CRISIS 33 (2010), https://www.huduser.gov/portal/publications/foreclosure_09.p

df [hereinafter HUD].
65. Barnes, supra note 57; see also MARTHINSEN, supra note 50, at 681 (explaining that
banks had changed their lending strategies to "increase [the] volume" of mortgages issued, even
though doing so involved failing to conduct checks on borrowers' credit and "ma[king] loans on
properties that did not exist").
66. ZANDI, supra note 36, at 5.
67. Id.
68. See MARTHINSEN, supra note 50, at 684.
at 682.
69. See id.
70. Barnes, supra note 57.
71. Underwater Mortgage,supra note 57.
72. See Sherter, supra note 62.
73. See Kaitlin Thomas, Stemming the Spiral of Foreclosures, YALE L. REP. 36, 37 (2009),
vacant
come
eviction
("With
ylr.law.yale.edu/pdfs/v56-2/S09_MortgageForeclosure.pdf
properties ... which often results in vandalism, which leads to plummeting property values in
surrounding neighborhoods, which leads to more foreclosure-a spiraling effect of neighborhood
depreciation and home foreclosures.").
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property values.7 4 Once property values dropped from their inflated

rates, borrowers found themselves in underwater mortgages. 7 That is to
say they owed more money on their mortgages than their homes were
worth. 76 The end result was inescapable: many homeowners decided to
walk out on their mortgages and cut their losses.77 As property values
crumbled all over the country, the financial world scrambled to pick up
the pieces, but it was too late. 78 The sudden depreciation of housing
prices caused borrowers to default and properties to foreclose
en masse.

79

In the aftermath of the foreclosure crisis, an estimated ten million
families lost their homes due to foreclosure.8 ° A. Gail Prudenti, thenNew York State Chief Administrative Judge, issued a report in 2013 in
which she detailed the increase in foreclosure case filings in New York's
courts: a projected 44,035 new foreclosure filings for that year, more
than the previous two years combined.81 Mortgage servicers were
woefully unprepared to manage the staggering number of foreclosure
cases coming before the courts, and they lacked the necessary
"incentives to devote additional resources to prove their banks'
ownership over each mortgage."8 2 The effects of the meltdown are being
felt still, with 72,000 foreclosure actions pending before the New York
State courts and 111,789 properties in New York in "pre-foreclosure
status" as of February 2017.83 A full decade has elapsed since the crisis,
74. See Sherter, supra note 62.
75. UnderwaterMortgage, supra note 57.
76. Id.
77. David Streitfeld, No Aid or Rebound in Sight, More Homeowners Just Walk Away, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 3, 2010, at Al, A3 (explaining that many borrowers purposefully walked out on their
mortgages even though they could still afford their mortgage payments).
78. See MARTHiNSEN, supra note 50, at 685-86 (describing how investors experienced
"substantial losses as these [mortgage-backed] investments eroded in value," that housing prices
depreciated significantly, and "mortgage delinquencies skyrocketed").
79. See Barnes, supranote 57.
80. Badger, supra note 12; Kusisto, supra note 12.
81.

A. GAIL PRUDENTI, 2013 REPORT OF THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR OF THE COURTS 2

(2013), https://www.nycourts.gov/publications/pdfs/2013ForeclosureReport.pdf. Judge A. Gail
Prudenti is now the Dean of the Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University. Judge A.
Gail Prudenti: Dean and Executive Director of the Centerfor Children, Families and the Law,
MAURICE A. DEANE SCHOOL OF LAW AT HOFSTRA UNIVERSITY, http://law.hofstra.edu/directory/
administration/prudenti/index.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2018).
82. Wachspress et al., supra note 15, at 1119-20 (footnote omitted).
83. INDEPENDENT DEMOCRATIC CONFERENCE, supra note 44, at 3-4.
Pre-foreclosure properties are properties that are in the early stages of being repossessed
due to a homeowner's inability to pay an outstanding mortgage obligation. Properties are
placed into this status when the lender files a pre-foreclosure notice with the Department
of Financial Services and sends the homeowner the 90-day pre-foreclosure notice
required by the legislation. If homeowners cannot afford to pay the amount owed to the
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and yet tens of thousands of homeowners across the state are still at risk
4
of losing their homes.1
Many commentators have openly speculated about the extent to
which the federal government was complicit in the foreclosure crisis by
failing to properly regulate the subprime mortgage industry.8 5 While
there has been much disagreement over the extent to which government
deregulation of Wall Street was to blame, 6 it is more or less undisputed
that large banks, mortgage servicers, and irresponsible investors played a
significant role. 7 Not only did the combined conduct of these actors
cause the mortgage meltdown; their questionable collection practices
exacerbated it.88 For example, in In re Schuessler,8 9 the court sanctioned
a mortgage servicer for creating the debtor's default by ordering the
servicer's branches to refuse the debtor's payments; for forcing the
debtor to accrue arrears on the debt when, before the servicer's refusal of
payments, the debtor was at most one payment behind at all relevant
times; and for ommiting certain material facts from its motion to lift the
automatic stay, 90 which the court recognized was likely filed only to
allow the servicer to commence foreclosure proceedings in state courta practice which would effectively deny the debtor their legally
protected right to a fresh start. 9 1 Practices like these had the effect of
lender, the home moves into foreclosure status and the lender attempts to recapture the
property and remove the homeowner from the home.
Id. at 4 (referring to N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1304 (McKinney 2009)).
84. Id. at 3-5.
85. HUD, supra note 64, at 42.
86. See, e.g., Richard M. Salsman, The Financial Crisis was a Failure of Government, Not
Free Markets, FORBES (Sept. 19, 2013, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/richardsalsman/
2013/09/19/the-financial-crisis-was-a-failure-of-govemment-not-free-markets/#e61018d5 1c39.
Some observers have blamed Washington for enabling Wall Street's poor financial decisions,
namely the Federal Reserve for manipulating interest rates and Congress for subsidizing mortgages
and failing to properly regulate the mortgage industry. See, e.g., Jill Drew, Frenzy: The Crash What Went Wrong, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2008, at Al, A6; Salsman, supra. Others have argued that
the foreclosure crisis precipitated largely from irresponsible practices on Wall Street. See, e.g.,
Anderson, supra note 43; Ritholtz, supra note 13.
87. See Wachspress et al., supra note 15, at 1119-20; Denning, supra note 46; Ritholtz, supra
note 13. But see Victoria V. Corder, Note, When Securitization Complicates the Issue: What are the
Homeowner's Defenses to Foreclosure, 16 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. & SOC. JUST. 299, 303 (2009)
("Deregulation enabled financial institutions to carry high debt-to-equity ratios, create complex
financial instruments, and trade those instruments in opaque markets." (footnotes omitted)).
88. See Zach Carter, Foreclosure Mills: Wall Street's Latest Fraud Scheme, HUFFINGTON
POST (Aug. 5, 2010, 10:36 AM), https://www.huffmgtonpost.com/zach-carter/foreclosure-millswall-st b 671732.html.
89. 386 B.R. 458 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008).
90. Id. at 463. When a debtor files for bankruptcy, a stay automatically comes into effect,
which operates as a bar to all debt collection efforts by creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012).
91. Schuessler, 386 B.R. at 463-64.
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forcing some homeowners into foreclosure when they could have
otherwise remained in their homes, continuing to make mortgage
payments.92 With the benefit of hindsight, there can be little doubt that
these dubious practices aggravated the foreclosure crisis and made any
meaningful response to it that much more difficult.93
B.

The ForeclosureMills: Exacerbation of a Crisis that was
Already Difficult to Contain

In the wake of the subprime mortgage meltdown, banks began to
outsource the handling of their foreclosure matters to powerhouse
foreclosure law firms, which are commonly called "foreclosure mills."94
Steven J. Baum, P.C. is one example-it was once the largest
foreclosure mill in New York and one of the largest in the country; it
handled roughly forty percent of New York's foreclosure cases and filed
more than 50,000 foreclosure cases in New York throughout the last
decade.9 5 For good reason, it is now nonexistent.9 6 The Baum firm was
thousands of mortgages, bank notes,
accused of "robo-signing"
affidavits, pleadings, and various other legal documents.98 But
foreclosure mills were not the only players in the mortgage industry
engaged in widespread "robo-signing." 99 Some of the largest financial
92. Jane Quinn, ForeclosureFraud: How You Can Be Driven to Default Even if You Pay on
Time, CBS NEWS (Oct. 13, 2010, 2:06 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/foreclosure-fraudhow-you-can-be-driven-to-default-even-if-you-pay-on-time.
93. See Carter, supranote 88.
94. See, e.g., Wachspress et al., supra note 15, at 1115 ("[S]ecuritization contracts incentivize
banks to use 'foreclosure mill' law firms to keep up with the flood of defaults, despite the fact that
these firms are unable and sometimes unwilling to detect and rectify basic legal errors."); Carter,
supra note 88 (explaining that foreclosure mills have a long history of "forg[ing] documents,
backdat[ing] signatures, slap[ping] families with thousands of dollars in illegal fees and even
foreclos[ing] on borrowers who haven't missed a payment").
95. Morgenson, supra note 16, at B 1.
96. See Lattman, supra note 16.
97. Matthew D. Weidner & Michael Fuino, Foreclosing in a Hurricane: Florida Courts
Struggle to Deal with a Crisis of Epic Proportions, 41 STETSON L. REv. 679, 716 (2012) ("Robosigning is the process through which various documents, including affidavits, assignments, and
possibly verifications of foreclosure complaints, are mass-signed by agents of
foreclosing plaintiffs.").
98. Morgenson, supra note 16, at BI, B4. These robo-signing practices led "a state court
judge in Brooklyn [to] call[] one foreclosure filing from the Baum firm 'incredible, outrageous,
ludicrous and disingenuous."' Lattman, supra note 16; see also Tami Luhby, I Was a Robo-Signer,
CNNMoNEY (Oct. 28, 2010, 8:47 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2010/10/28/realestate/
robosigner/index.htm?iid=EL (describing how robo-signing led judges to "increasingly question[]
whether the servicers have their paperwork in order").
99. Michelle Conlin, Banks' Foreclosure 'Robo-Signers' Were Hair Stylists, Teens, Walmart
Workers: Lawsuit, HUFFINGTON POST, (Oct. 13, 2010, 4:42 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2010/10/13/meet-banks-robosigners-fo-n_761698.html.
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behemoths engaged in the same, including JPMorgan Chase, Bank of
America, GMAC Mortgage Corporation, and Litton Loan Servicing, a
division of Goldman Sachs.10 0
It seems as though anyone less than qualified was hired as a robosigner. 101 Teenagers, Walmart employees, assembly line workers, and
hairdressers were among those "entrusted as the records custodians of
10 2
homeowners' loans," even though they received "no formal training."
They were hired based on their inexperience, ignorance, and propensity
to do as they were told without question.1" 3 In rapid-fire sequence, they
blindly signed one legal document after another, amounting to 10,000 or
more documents signed by each employee in any given month;
documents which were then filed with state courts to the detriment of
hundreds of thousands of homeowners across New York and beyond.'0 4
The United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of
New York and the New York Attorney General's Office investigated the
Baum firm for "fil[ing] misleading pleadings, affidavits, and mortgage
assignments in state and federal courts in New York," alleging that the
documents were riddled with factual inaccuracies and unsupported
allegations."0 5 These criticisms were echoed by borrowers' attorneys, at
least one bankruptcy judge in the Southern District of New York who
expressly refused to continue accepting any papers filed by Baum's firm,
and a law professor from Albany Law School. 0 6 In November 2011,
only one month after entering into a $2 million settlement with the

100. Id.; David Streitfeld, JPMorganSuspending Foreclosures,N.Y. TMES, Sept. 29, 2010, at
B1.
101.

See NORMAN

A. KATZ, DETECTING AND REDUCING

SUPPLY CHAIN FRAUD 118

(Routledge 2016) (2012) (citations omitted); Conlin, supra note 99; Foreclosure "Robo-Signers"
Unqualified? (CBS television broadcast Oct. 14, 2010).
102. KATZ, supra note 101, at 118; Conlin, supra note 99; Foreclosure "Robo-Signers"
Unqualified?,supra note 101.
103. See Conlin, supra note 99 (reporting that bank employees were unable to "define basic
terms like promissory note, mortgagee, lien, receiver, jurisdiction, circuit court, plaintiff's assignor
or defendant ... [and] ... didn't know why a spouse might claim interest in a property, what the
required conditions were for a bank to foreclose or who the holder of [a] mortgage note was").
104. See Jesse Soslow, Comment, Incentivizing Deeds in Lieu of Foreclosure: An Argument
for the Expansion of the Home Affordable ForeclosureAlternatives ("H-AFA "') Program, 14 U. PA.
J. BUS. L. 583, 585-86 (2012); Streitfeld, supra note 100.
105. Morgenson, supra note 16, at B4 (noting that, when Baum's firm was unable to identify
every link in a property's title history, it "prepared inaccurate papers to fill in what was missing");
Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office S. Dist. N.Y., Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces
Agreement with Mortgage Foreclosure Law Firm to Overhaul its Practices and Pay $2 Million Fine
(Oct.
6,
2011),
http://www.appellate-briefcom/images/stories/PDF/10-6-1 1USAttyPR.pdf
[hereinafter U.S. Attorney's Office].
106. Morgenson, supra note 16, at B4.
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United States Attorney's Office,107 Baum announced that his firm was
permanently shutting its doors, but not before leaving thousands of
unresolved foreclosure cases in serious doubt.'0 8
III.

EXTENDING THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS THROUGH
MORTGAGE DECELERATION

As the foreclosure crisis reached its apex, massive robo-signing
scandals plagued thousands of foreclosure cases with misfiled, factually
inaccurate documents. 109 That, coupled with the complex mortgage
assignment schemes which pervaded the securities and housing markets,
made proving ownership of these mortgages considerably difficult for
lenders and loan servicers.1t 0 As a result, many foreclosure cases have
been left to languish in court, only to eventually become discontinued or
dismissed."' Some of those cases are now time-barred by New York's
six-year statute of limitations, and consequently, the related mortgages
are now uncollectable 2 Subpart A explains what the statute of
limitations is, and how, in the foreclosure context, it was designed to
protect homeowners' property interests.113 Subpart A also describes the
procedural obstacles that every foreclosure case must go through for this
purpose." 4 Subpart B begins by analyzing the concept of "deceleration,"
a novel argument that lenders are now raising in their persistent attempts
to evade the statute of limitations bar to successive foreclosure

107. U.S. Attorney's Office, supra note 105.
108. Lattman, supranote 16; see Morgenson, supra note 16, at B1, B4.
109. See Bernhard, supra note 24, at 3 1; supra notes 97-104, 105-06 and accompanying text.
110. See Corder, supra note 87, at 319 (explaining that, in many cases, assignments were never
recorded, and quite possibly, "original mortgages were assigned without the [promissory] notes");
Nolan Robinson, Note, The Case Against Allowing Mortgage Electronic RegistrationSystems, Inc.
(MERS) to Initiate ForeclosureProceedings, 32 CARDOZO L. REv. 1621, 1643 (2011) (illustrating
the complexity of the assignment processes that mortgages undergo before legal action is taken to
foreclose); infra Part HLI.A (describing how complex mortgage assignment schemes have made it
difficult for banks and loan servicers to prove ownership of mortgages).
111. See Wachspress et al., supra note 15, at 1121 ("In many individual
cases ... [h]omeowners, their attorneys, and sometimes judges have successfully prevented
foreclosure by demonstrating the falsity of an affidavit or simply by forcing the mortgagee to
produce actual documentation that it owned the mortgage." (footnote omitted)); Bernhard, supra
note 22, at 31 (describing how robo-signing led to "mass misfilings" in Florida courts, which in turn
prompted foreclosing plaintiffs to voluntarily discontinue thousands of foreclosure cases so as to
give themselves time to gather the necessary paperwork and "refile another day"); see also infra
Part III.B (discussing several cases that involved such dismissals and discontinuances).
112. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(4) (McKinney 2018); Saini v. Cincelli Enters., Inc., 733
N.Y.S.2d 824, 826 (App. Div. 2001); Wachspress et al., supra note 15, at 1117-18.
113. See infra Part III.A.
114. See infra Part III.A.
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actions.1 15 Subpart B then proceeds to illustrate the sharp divide among
the courts on this issue: whether a voluntary discontinuance can be made
without any additional proof that the mortgage
to decelerate a mortgage
6
was decelerated."f
A.

ProceduralMechanisms that ProtectHomeowners' PropertyRights

Since antiquity, statutes of limitation have played an important role
in protecting defendants' property rights.'17 Through the passage of time,
defendants are entitled to live their lives in peace, secure in the
knowledge that the slate has been wiped clean and what they own is
rightfully theirs." 8 They should not be forced to litigate after "evidence
has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared."' " 19
As the New York Court of Appeals observed: "Our statutes of limitation
serve the same objectives of finality, certainty and predictability that
New York's contract law endorses. Statutes of limitation not only save
litigants from defending stale claims, but also 'express[] a societal
interest or public policy of giving repose to human affairs."" 2
Moreover, the right to exclude others from intruding on one's land,
being generally considered "one of the most essential sticks in the
bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property,"'' would
be of little value if property owners were made to go about their days
sleeplessly waiting to be evicted. 2
115. See infra Part II.B.
116. See infra Part II.B.
117. See Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1177-80,
1185 (1950) [hereinafter Developments in the Law] (detailing the history and purpose of statutes of
limitation). But see Note, Tolling the Statute of Limitations on Mortgage Foreclosures,51 COLUM.
L. REV. 1030, 1031 (1951) [hereinafter Tolling the Statute of Limitations] (noting, however, that
although "[s]tatutory limitations on legal actions to recover property are of ancient
origin... [s]tatutes barring equitable actions are... strictly modem").
118. Tolling the Statute of Limitations, supra note 117, at 1030; Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
The Path ofLaw, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 477 (1897) ("A thing which you have enjoyed and used as
your own for a long time, whether property or an opinion, takes root in your being and cannot be
torn away without your resenting the act and trying to defend yourself, however you came by it. The
law can ask no better justification than the deepest instincts of man.").
119. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944);
Developments in the Law, supra note 117, at 1185.
120. ACE Secs. Corp. v. DB Structured Prods., Inc., 36 N.E.3d 623, 627-28 (N.Y. 2015)
(quoting John J. Kassner & Co., Inc. v. City of New York, 389 N.E.2d 99, 103 (N.Y. 1979)).
121. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979); accord Thomas W. Merrill,
Essay, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 753 (1998) ("[T]o the extent one
has the right to exclude, then one has property; conversely, to the extent one does not have
exclusion rights, one does not have property.").
122. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3527 (West 2016) ("The law helps the vigilant, before those who
sleep on their rights."); FRANCIS T. TALTY, ET AL., 5 MASS. PRAC., METHODS OF PRACTICE § 13:11
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Notwithstanding these principles, there are cases where exceptions
must be made, lest there be unconscionable injustice inflicted upon an
unwitting plaintiff.123 Although homeowners have an interest in
remaining in their homes, lenders also have a property interest in
collecting on outstanding debt. 124 To protect the latter, the law has
carved out tolling exceptions. 125 For example, the statute of limitations
may be tolled when a debtor affirmatively acknowledges the debt by a
signed writing, the theory being that "an unqualified admission of the
debt implies a new promise to pay it."' 2 6 When a debtor files for
bankruptcy, the statute of limitations for filing a foreclosure action is
tolled for the duration of the automatic stay. 127 It is also currently
possible, depending on which jurisdiction the parties find themselves in,
for the statute of limitations to be reset upon the discontinuance of a
foreclosure action.'2 8 The reasoning underlying this rule proceeds as
follows: since the statute of limitations starts to run on the entire debt at
the time of the mortgage acceleration, 129 and because the mortgage may
30
automatically be accelerated upon the filing of a foreclosure action,
the voluntary discontinuance of a foreclosure action operates to revoke
the acceleration, thereby resetting the statute of limitations to the state it
(4th ed. 2000) ("[T]he entry to foreclose.., involves the right to exclude and dispossess the owner
of the equity and even treat him as a trespasser.").
123. Tolling the Statute of Limitations,supra note 117, at 1030-3 1.
124. See Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v. Weisblum, 923 N.Y.S.2d 609, 618 (App. Div. 2011);
Tolling the Statute of Limitations,supra note 117, at 1031.
125. Tolling the Statute ofLimitations, supra note 117, at 1031, 1033-35; D. KIRK DRUSSEL ET
AL., 2 MORTGAGES AND MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE INN.Y.§ 35:2 (2017).
126. 31 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS

§ 79:77 (4th ed. 2004); see N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW. § 17-105(1) (McKinney 2006); Petito v. Piffath,
647 N.E.2d 732, 735 (N.Y. 1994); see also 75A N.Y. JUR. 2D LIMITATIONS AND LACHES § 337
(2012) (explaining that the writing must "contain[] nothing inconsistent" with the debtor's intention
to pay the debt (footnote omitted)).
127. 11 U.S.C. § 108(c) (2012); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 204(a) (McKinney 2003); see also PAMELA
Ko & JENEAN TARANTO, BOWMAR MORTGAGE LIENS IN NEW YORK § 18:4 (2017) (explaining that
the courts are currently divided on whether the time in which the automatic stay was effective is
added to the remaining time for filing an action under the statute of limitations).
128. See U.S. Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Wongsonadi, No. 703762/2015, 2017 WL 1333442, at *2
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Queens Cnty. Apr. 5, 2017); U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Deochand, No. 702859/16,
slip op. at 4-5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Queens Cnty. Mar. 1, 2017). But see BSD 265, LLC v. HSBC Bank
USA N.A., No. 504656/16, 2017 WL 2778454, at *7-8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. June 27, 2017)
(holding that the discontinuance of a foreclosure action does not, by itself, operate as a revocation of
a mortgage acceleration and therefore cannot estop a defendant from asserting a statute of
limitations defense to a later foreclosure action).
129. Saini v. Cincelli Enters., Inc., 733 N.Y.S.2d 824, 826 (App. Div. 2001).
130. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 943 N.Y.S.2d 540, 542-43 (App. Div. 2012)
("Commencement of a foreclosure action may be sufficient to put the borrower on notice that the
option to accelerate the debt has been exercised." (citations omitted)).
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would have been in had the mortgage not been accelerated.131 When
applied broadly, these tolling exceptions impede the alienability of land
by increasing the potential for litigation, thus creating a "conflict
between the policy of real property law and the policy upon which
'
It is therefore of little wonder why
tolling exceptions rest."132
to be applied under narrow, specifically
tolling exceptions are made
133
delineated circumstances.
The point at which the statute of limitations begins to run on an
unpaid mortgage depends entirely on whether the mortgage was
accelerated. 13 4 After a mortgage is originally issued on real property, the
underlying debt is made payable in individual installments. 135 "A
separate cause of action arises on each installment, and the statute of
limitations runs separately against each. 13 6 When a mortgage is
accelerated, however-either automatically pursuant to the terms of the
mortgage agreement, or by the creditor pursuant to an optional
acceleration clause-the entire amount becomes due and the statute of
limitations begins to run on the entire debt.' 37 Through acceleration, a
mortgagee can collect on the whole debt in one foreclosure action,
whereas without acceleration, the mortgagee would only be able to
collect on the arrears due in unpaid past installments, discounting any
future payments that may or not be paid.138 Most often, mortgages are
accelerated automatically upon the commencement of a foreclosure
action.13 9 However, it is not at all clear whether a mortgage may
automatically be decelerated solely by a lender's voluntary
discontinuance or a court's involuntary dismissal.14 ° It is far from
131. Bernhard, supra note 24, at 32. Compare Wongsonadi, 2017 WL 1333442, at *2
(accepting this argument), and Deochand, slip op. at 4-5 (same), with BSD 265, LLC, 2017 WL
2778454, at *7-8 (rejecting this argument). This argument is the primary focus of this Note and is
addressed infra Parts ILI.B and IV.A in greater depth.
132. Tolling the Statute of Limitations,supra note 117, at 1031.
133. See, e.g., Salois v. Dime Sav. Bank of N.Y., FSB, 128 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 1997) (quoting
Heideman v. PFL, Inc., 904 F.2d 1262, 1266 (8th Cir. 1990)) ("[E]quitable tolling of a federal
statute of limitations is 'appropriate only when the circumstances that cause a plaintiff to miss a
filing deadline are out of his hands."').
134. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 943 N.Y.S.2d 540, 542 (App. Div. 2012).
135. Id.
136. WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 126, § 79:17; accord Bay Area Laundry & Dry Cleaning
Pension Tr. Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of Cal., Inc., 522 U.S. 192, 208-09 (1997).
137. Costa v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., 247 F. Supp. 3d 329, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (citing
EMC Mortg. Corp. v. Patella, 720 N.Y.S.2d 161, 162 (App. Div. 2001)); Burke, 943 N.Y.S.2d at
542; WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 126, § 79:18; Greco & Singh, supranote 25.
138. Greco & Singh, supra note 25.
139. See id.
140. See infra Part l1I.B (discussing several cases that address this question); infra Part IV.B
(proposing a solution that, if applied, would answer this question in the negative).
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hyperbolic to say that the answer to this question may either reinforce or
fatally undermine the statute of limitations and all the policy reasons for
14 1
its existence.

The statute of limitations is not the only procedural impediment to
lenders' eviction efforts; numerous other procedural safeguards exist for
the purpose of protecting homeowners in foreclosure actions. 142 Typical
foreclosure proceedings include:
[T]he filing of a foreclosure complaint and lis pendens notice; 143 the
service of process on all parties whose interests may be prejudiced by
the

proceeding;

a

hearing

before

a

judge ...; the

entry

of... judgment; the notice of sale; a public foreclosure sale, usually
conducted by a sheriff; the postsale adjudication as to the disposition
of the foreclosure proceeds; and, if appropriate, the entry of a
deficiency judgment. An appeal may follow in some cases.144
Like the statute of limitations, these proceedings were designed largely,
if not primarily, to protect homeowners' property rights. 145 Before a
foreclosure action is even commenced, the homeowner must be served
with a notice that clearly indicates that he or she is "at risk of losing
[the] ...home" and provides the homeowner with certain contact
information for "free or very low-cost" housing counseling services, as
well as other vital information. 146 At least ninety days thereafter, 147 the
141. See infra Part IV.A.
142. See Erica Braudy, Note, Tax a Bank, Save a Home: Judicial, Legislative, and Other
Creative Efforts to Prevent Foreclosures in New York, 17 CUNY L. REv. 309, 317-18 (2014)

(emphasizing the benefits of effective legal representation in foreclosure proceedings).
143. See Jeanne M. Naflky, 54 C.J.S. Lis Pendens § 18 (2010) ("Ordinarily, the doctrine
of lispendens operates to charge a subsequent purchaser of property and third parties having an
interest in property with notice of actions concerning that property." (footnote omitted)).
144. Grant S.Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure: The Uniform Nonjudicial
ForeclosureAct, 53 DUKE L.J. 1399, 1403 (2004) (footnote omitted). Deficiency judgments provide
lenders with a mechanism for obtaining the remainder of unpaid debt after a foreclosure sale has
been made, so long as the price the property sold for amounted to less than the total amount owed.
N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1371(1)-(2) (McKinney 2009).
145. See Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v. Weisblum, 923 N.Y.S.2d 609, 614-15 (App. Div. 2011)
(citing First Nat'l Bank of Chi. v. Silver, 899 N.Y.S.2d 256, 258-59 (App. Div. 2010)) (finding that
the purpose underlying the Home Equity Theft Prevention Act, and by extension, sections 1303 and
1304 of New York's Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law, was to
"protect[] ...homeowners confronted with foreclosure"); Eloisa Rodriguez-Dod, Stop Shutting the
Door on Renters: Protecting Tenantsfrom Foreclosure Evictions, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
243, 248-65 (2010) (discussing the legal developments that have taken place to curb the foreclosure
crisis and protect homeowners from losing their homes).
146. REAL PROP. ACTS. § 1304 (requiring such notice to be made at least ninety days prior to
commencement of a foreclosure action); Weisblum, 923 N.Y.S.2d at 614-15; see also RodriguezDod, supra note 145, at 255-56 (noting that states differ as to what type of notice is required and
when (e.g., "notice of ...default, notice of the foreclosure proceeding, notice of sale, notice to
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homeowner must be served with a copy of the summons and complaint,
as in any other civil action, so as to be given notice of the lawsuit and a
fair opportunity to mount a defense.1 48 When service of process is
contested, the court may hold a traverse hearing, at which the defendant
makes a special appearance to contest the validity of service and where
both parties submit evidence to establish whether service was
sufficient. 149 After proper service has been established, the plaintiff must
then prove five distinct elements before it is permitted to evict the
homeowner. 150 On the whole, the process in New York takes an average
of 934 days from the date the foreclosure action is commenced to the
date a foreclosure sale is ordered.' 51 Like the statute of limitations, this
process, as time-consuming as it is, has been carefully designed to
thwart frivolous foreclosure efforts and to52help homeowners stay in their
homes or otherwise avoid homelessness.1
To further protect homeowners' property interests from being
placed in jeopardy without good cause, the law requires lenders to
demonstrate that they also have a property interest; namely, an interest in

vacate, and notice of eviction"), and that "[t]he more forms of notice a tenant receives, especially if
notice is sent at varied intervals in the foreclosure proceeding, the more the tenant is protected"
(footnotes omitted)).
147. See REAL PROP. ACTS. § 1304.
148. As in all civil actions in law and equity, due process requires service of process as an
essential prerequisite to the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over the homeowner and its
authority to render a final judgment on the homeowner's right to remain in the home. See N.Y.
C.P.L.R. § 308 (McKinney 2010); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-15
(1950); Brown v. Giesecke, 338 N.Y.S.2d 967, 968 (App. Div. 1972).
149. See, e.g., NYCTL 1998-1 Tr. v. Rabinowitz, 777 N.Y.S.2d 483, 484 (App. Div. 2004)
("[A] sworn non-conclusory denial of service by a defendant is sufficient to dispute the veracity or
content of the affidavit [of service], requiring a traverse hearing."); Styllanou v. Tsourides, 422
N.Y.S.2d 748, 749 (App. Div. 1979).
150. wachspress et al., supra note 15, at 1117.
In a foreclosure suit, the bank must generally prove the following: (1) the homeowner
has signed both the note (the underlying loan) and the mortgage assigning the house as
collateral for that note; (2) the bank owns the note and mortgage; (3) the homeowner still
owes a debt to the bank; (4) the homeowner is behind on that debt; and (5) the bank has
accelerated that remaining debt in accordance with the terms of the note itself. When a
bank fails to prove these elements, a judge is legally required to rule in favor of the
homeowner.
Id. (footnote omitted).
151. N.Y. ST. DEP'T OF FIN. SERVS., REPORT ON NEW YORK'S FORECLOSURE PROCESS 4-5
(2015), http://www.dfs.ny.gov/reportpub/foreproc-report 052015.pdf (comparing this figure with
the national average of 604 days).
152. See Rodriguez-Dod, supra note 145, at 248-52 (describing various policies of Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac, which involved suspending foreclosures and evictions while providing
opportunities for mortgage modifications and offering financial incentives to homeowners so that
they may move into another home).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol46/iss4/10

18

Nevola: Foreclosure Madness: Using Mortgage Deceleration to Evade the Sta

2018]

FORECLOSURE MADNESS

recovering unpaid debt owed on the property.153 This is the standing
doctrine, which, in the foreclosure context, demands that lenders furnish
a true copy of the promissory note that clearly shows the total amount of
money owed to them.154 Standing can be satisfied only by the "plaintiff
[showing that she] ... is both the holder or assignee of the subject
mortgage and the holder or assignee of the underlying note at the time
'
the action is commenced."155
Most critical to a standing analysis is
whether the plaintiff is in possession of the note.156 Once a promissory
note is tendered to and accepted by an assignee, "the mortgage passes as
an incident to the note."' 57 For an assignment to be properly effectuated,
the note must be physically delivered to the assignee or a written
instrument must be executed.5 I
In securitized mortgage transactions, negotiable instruments are
typically assigned pursuant to custodial systems created by pooling and
servicing agreements ("PSA").'59 Under these agreements, a trust or a
custodian holds the promissory note throughout the life of the loan. 160 In
the event of a default, the note is transferred to a servicer, who then
seeks immediate repayment of the debt.' 6 1 If the debtor fails to pay once
notified of the default, the PSA authorizes the servicer to bring a
foreclosure action. 62 Even where the PSA has clearly designated the
party required to hold the note, servicers have nonetheless filed
foreclosure actions without possession of the note and without any proof
that the note is in the trust's possession. 63 Compounding this problem,
153. See Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v. Weisblum, 923 N.Y.S.2d 609, 618 (App. Div. 2011).
154. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v. Taylor, 34 N.E.3d 363, 366 (N.Y. 2015); Weisblum, 923
N.Y.S.2d at 618.
155. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Dellarmo, 942 N.Y.S.2d 122, 124 (App. Div. 2012) (quoting
Bank of N.Y. v. Silverberg, 926 N.Y.S.2d 532, 537 (App. Div. 2011)).
156. Taylor, 34 N.E.3d at 366 ("[T]he note, and not the mortgage, is the dispositive instrument
that conveys standing to foreclose under New York law.").
157. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Silverberg, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 537); Mortg.
Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Coakley, 838 N.Y.S.2d 622, 623 (App. Div. 2007) (citing Payne v.
Wilson, 74 N.Y. 348, 354-55 (1878)).
158. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 244 (McKinney 2010); Weisblum, 923 N.Y.S.2d at 618;
Indymac Bank v. Bethley, No. 9615/08, 2009 WL 279304, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 6, 2009).
159. See Tran v. Bank of N.Y., No. 13 Civ. 580 (RPP), 2014 WL 1225575, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 24, 2014), aff'd, 592 F. App'x 24 (2d Cir. 2015); Wachspress et al., supra note 15, at 1119.
160. See Rajamin v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., 757 F.3d 79, 82-83 (2d Cir. 2014); Tran,
2014 WL 1225575, at *1.
161. Rajamin, 757 F.3d at 82-83; Tran, 2014 WL 1225575, at *1.
162. See Tran, 2014 WL 1225575, at *1; Wachspress etal., supra note 15, at 1119.
163. See, e.g., In re Mims, 438 B.R. 52, 56-57, 58 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (denying the
creditor's motion to lift the automatic stay where the creditor presented no evidence of standing to
pursue their state law foreclosure remedy, i.e., that the note was properly transferred to the creditor);
Wachspress et al., supra note 15, at 1119 (explaining how the application of these pooling and
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the securitization process has subjected many mortgages and notes to a
making tracking of the notes'
convoluted series of assignments,
16 4
ownership exceedingly difficult.
Beyond just authorizing loan servicers to commence foreclosure
proceedings, PSAs also created fee structures that discouraged those
servicers and their attorneys from allocating the appropriate resources to
pursue foreclosures successfully.' 65 When the amount of foreclosures
surged in 2007, the servicers did not bother expanding additional
resources; rather, they tasked their employees with robo-signing
"hundreds of thousands of affidavits" which purportedly proved the
although in reality, many of those
servicers' ownership of the mortgages,
166
affidavits did no such thing.
The servicers' natural next step was to attempt to foreclose on those
mortgages, but with "sloppy paperwork" and no proof of ownership,
167
they often failed to satisfy the threshold standing requirement.
Consequently, courts have denied orders of reference, withheld default
68
judgments, and have even dismissed some cases with prejudice.'
IndyMac Fed. Bank, FSB v. Meisels169 is one example. 70 There, the
servicing agreements led banks to make mistakes when documenting their ownership of mortgages).
164. Wachspress et al., supra note 15, at 1119; see also U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Greenpoint Mortg.
Funding, Inc., No. 600352/09, 2010 WL 841367, at *1 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 3, 2010) (describing one such
assignment scheme where more than 30,000 loans, valued at least $1.8 billion, underwent multiple
assignments before being deposited into a trust and securitized).
165. Wachspress et al., supra note 15, at 1119 ("Each servicing agreement paid servicers a flat
annual fee of around 0.25% of the loan's total value (for example, $500 per year on a $200,000
loan), but the cost of pursuing a single foreclosure cost servicers around $2,500." (footnote
omitted)).
166. Id.atl119-20.
167. Id.at 1120-21.
168. See, e.g., U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Merino, 836 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854-55 (Sup. Ct. 2007)
(denying an order of reference and holding that the plaintiff failed to prove standing where it
submitted an affidavit and a dubious, hand-altered assignment which were purportedly signed by
two different individuals, respectively, but which were not accompanied with any evidence that the
individuals had the authority to act on behalf of the bank); IndyMac Fed. Bank, FSB v. Meisels, No.
8752/09, 2012 WL 4748473, at *4-9, *11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 4, 2012) (finding that the plaintiff
lacked standing to bring a foreclosure action and dismissing the action with prejudice); Indymac
Bank, FSB v. Bethley, No. 9615/08, 2009 WL 279304, at *7, *14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 6, 2009)
(denying the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and order of reference where standing had
not been proven because the mortgage assignment was "retroactively predate[d]" to a date prior to
the filing of the summons and complaint). An order of reference is a motion made by a plaintiff
directing the court to appoint a referee to compute the total amount owed on the mortgage, and to
determine whether the mortgaged property "can be sold in parcels." N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW
§ 1321 (McKinney 2009). An order of reference is "a preliminary step towards obtaining a
judgment of foreclosure." Home Savs. of Am., F.A. v. Gkanios, 646 N.Y.S.2d 530, 531 (App. Div.
1996).
169. 2012 WL4748473.
170. Id. at *29.
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"failed" bank IndyMac, which was previously sold by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation and therefore ceased to exist when the
foreclosure action was filed, was nonetheless assigned a mortgage by the
"infamous robosigner Erica Johnson-Seck" and represented by counsel
who was attempting to collect on the mortgage debt.' 71 Because the
assignment was ineffectual, the loan servicer was unable to prove that it
17 2
was the owner of the note and therefore lacked standing to foreclose.
Accordingly, the court dismissed the case with prejudice.17 3 In similar
situations, it has not been unusual for a lender to refile a foreclosure
action at a later date, and when confronted with a motion to dismiss the
later action as time-barred, to argue that the later action was filed within
the time prescribed by the statute of limitations.'74
Aside from those occasions where a case is dismissed or
discontinued due to chain of title and standing issues, there is at least one
other instance where the applicability of the statute of limitations may be
called into question.' 75 After the statute of limitations for bringing a
foreclosure action has expired, the homeowner may bring an action to
quiet title to the property. 176 From a policy perspective, quiet title actions
promote the alienability of property. 177 If the quiet title action is
successful, any encumbrances and liens resulting from the unpaid
mortgage-which the lender would not be able to foreclose on due to the
statute of limitations-are removed.'78 Because the expiration of the
statute of limitations is a condition precedent to the commencement of a
quiet title action, creditors have argued for the dismissal of quiet title
actions, insisting that the statute of limitations has not expired because
the mortgage was decelerated by the discontinuance of an earlier
171.
172.

Id. at *4-9, *10, *14.
Id. at*'14-15.

173. Id. at *29.
174. Id. The author of this Note is not referring here to cases that were dismissed with
prejudice, but to cases with facts otherwise similar to the facts in Meisels. See Bernhard, supra note
24, at 32.
175. See BSD 265, LLC v. HSBC Bank USA N.A., No. 504656/16, 2017 WL 2778454, at *1,
*5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 27, 2017).

176. N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1501(4) (McKinney 2009).
177. Sonja Larsen, 65 Am. Jur. 2d Quieting Title and Determinationof Adverse Claims § 1
(2011) ("[T]he purpose of a quiet title statute has been set forth as being to free the land of the cloud
resting upon it and make its title clear and indisputable, so that it may enter the channels of
commerce and trade unfettered and without the handicap of suspicion." (footnote omitted)); Tolling
the Statute of Limitations, supra note 117, at 1036 (explaining that quiet title statutes were enacted
to allow for the destruction of a lien "after a certain period of time" because legislatures in various
jurisdictions, including New York, recognized that "tolling provisions to the statute of limitations
prevent the free alienability of land and are often unfair to bona fide purchasers").
178. REAL PROP. ACTS. § 1501(4).
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foreclosure action.' 79 If this argument is universally accepted, many
quiet title actions (which might otherwise be successful) are likely to be
dismissed, and any encumbrances on the land resulting from the subject
mortgages would then remain, at least until the lenders prevail in later
foreclosure actions.180

B.

Uncertainty in the Law: Can Decelerationbe Used to
Circumvent the Statute ofLimitations?

Whether the discontinuance or dismissal of a foreclosure action can
operate as a revocation of a lender's election to accelerate a mortgage is
an open question and a source of ongoing debate among courts and
practitioners. 181 Although the New York Court of Appeals has not yet
weighed in on this issue,'8 2 lenders did receive strong support from the
Florida Supreme Court in Bartram v. US. Bank National Ass 'n. 183 In
Bartram, the plaintiffs prior foreclosure action was dismissed with
prejudice because the plaintiff failed to appear for a case management
conference. 18 4 Florida's five-year statute of limitations was said to have
expired after the mortgage was accelerated but before the plaintiff
brought a second foreclosure action. 85 Rejecting the borrower's claim
that the second foreclosure action was time-barred, Florida's high court
held that the dismissal of the first foreclosure action was by itself
sufficient to decelerate the mortgage.186 The court reasoned that the
dismissal of the first case returned the parties to their status quo ante,
and that the borrower had the right to resume making monthly
installment payments after the dismissal.' 8 7 If the borrower defaulted on
those payments when they became due, the statute of limitations was
said to run separately on each subsequent payment.' 8 8 In short, the
plaintiff was permitted to evade the statute of limitations without

179. See id.; BSD 265, LLC v. HSBC Bank USA N.A., No. 504656/16, 2017 WL 2778454,
at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 27, 2017).
180.

See REAL PROP. ACTS. § 1501(4).

181.

See BSD 265, LLC, 2017 WL 2778454, at *7; Greco & Singh, supra note 25.

182.

BSD 265, LLC, 2017 WL 2778454, at *7 (recognizing that there is no controlling

authority in New York on the issue of whether a mortgage acceleration may be revoked by the
discontinuance of a foreclosure action); Greco & Singh, supra note 25 (same).
183. 211 So.3d 1009 (Fla. 2016).
184. Id. at 1016.
185. Seeid at 1015.

186.
187.
188.

Id. at 1021.
Id. at 1021-22.
Id.at 1022.
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presenting any evidence that it took affirmative steps to revoke the
prior acceleration.

189

Unlike the current state of the law in Florida, New York law is not
so clear on this issue. 190 In the recent case of BSD 265, LLC v. HSBC
Bank USA N.A., 9 ' Kings County Supreme Court Justice Lawrence
Knipel found that a voluntary discontinuance of a prior foreclosure
192
action did not operate as a revocation of the mortgage acceleration.
Citing to the New York Appellate Division, Second Department, and
quoting the Third Department, the court held:
[A] ... voluntary

discontinuance

of

[a] ... foreclosure

action

alone... [does] not revoke the acceleration of the mortgage debt and
reset the statute of limitations period. A lender may revoke its election
to accelerate all sums due under an optional acceleration clause in a
mortgage provided that there is no change in the borrower's position in
reliance thereon. After the mortgage debt has been accelerated, the
acceleration may only "be revoked ' 93through an affirmative act
occurring within the limitations period."'
Even though the court in BSD 265, LLC rejected the lender's
argument in no uncertain terms, other lower courts have held
differently. 94 For example, in U.S. Bank N.A. v. Wongsonadi,195 Queens
County Supreme Court Justice Robert McDonald held that the lender's
voluntary discontinuance of a prior foreclosure action, by itself, did
constitute a revocation of the mortgage acceleration. 196 Quoting the
Second Department, Justice McDonald wrote: "'When an action is
discontinued, it is as if [sic] had never been; everything done in the
action is annulled and all prior orders in the case are nullified.' Thus, the
election to accelerate contained in the complaint was nullified when
plaintiff voluntarily discontinued the prior action."' 9 7 The
189.

See id.

190.

See BSD 265, LLC v. HSBC Bank USA N.A., No. 504656/16, 2017 WL 2778454, at *7

(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. June 27, 2017); Greco & Singh, supra note 25.
191. 2017 WL 2778454.

192.
193.

Id. at*1, *6.
Id. at *6 (first citing Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n v. Mebane, 618 N.Y.S.2d 88, 89 (App. Div.

2d 1994); and then quoting Lavin v. Elmakiss, 754 N.Y.S.2d 741, 743 (App. Div. 3d 2003)).
In Mebane, the Second Department held that a mortgage acceleration could not be revoked after the

statute of limitations for filing a new foreclosure action has expired. 618 N.Y.S.2d at 89.
194. See BSD 265, LLC, 2017 WL 2778454, at *7-8; U.S. Bank, Nat'l Ass'n v. Wongsonadi,
No. 703762/2015, 2017 WL 1333442, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Queens Cnty. Apr. 5, 2017); U.S. Bank
Nat'l Ass'n v. Deochand, No. 702859/16, slip op. at 5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Queens Cnty. Mar. 1, 2017).
195. 2017 WL 1333442.

196. Id. at *2.
197. Id. (quoting Newman v. Newman, 665 N.Y.S.2d 423,424 (App. Div. 1997)).
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discontinuance of the prior foreclosure action was therefore considered
"an affirmative act of revocation," and the subsequent foreclosure action
'
was held to have been filed "timely."198
Another example of a court accepting the lender's argument can be
1 99 where Queens
found in U.S. Bank National Ass'n v. Deochand,
County Supreme Court Justice Howard Lane concluded that the
discontinuance of a prior foreclosure action was enough to revoke the
mortgage acceleration and that the statute of limitations did not bar a
second foreclosure action. 200 After coming to this conclusion, the court
went on to find that the bank proved standing as well as its prima facie
entitlement to foreclosure; that the plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment therefore had to be granted; and that the defendant's motion
for summary judgment had to be denied.2 11 In sum, these holdings
20 2
amount to a significant difference of opinion among the lower courts.
Ancillary to the deceleration issue are two preliminary questions
that must also be addressed.20 3 The first is whether a distinction should
be made between voluntary discontinuances and involuntary dismissals,
and the second is what the standard of proof should be for a lender to
prove deceleration.20 4 To answer these questions, NANT Realty Corp. v.
Knoxville 2012 Trust 0 5 presents a convenient starting point.20 6 There,
the Second Department found that, although a mortgage acceleration can
be revoked, some form of proof tending to show an "affirmative act of
revocation" is required.20 7 Distinguishing between cases involving a
prior foreclosure action that was involuntarily dismissed by a court and
cases where a prior foreclosure action was voluntarily discontinued by a
plaintiff, the court recognized that, although a dismissal does not amount
to an "affirmative act" of revocation, a voluntary discontinuance "do[es]
not disprove" that such an affirmative act occurred. 8
198. Wongsonadi, 2017 WL 1333442, at *2.
199. Slip op. at 4-5.
200. Id. at 4-5 (citing 4 Cosgrove 950 Corp. v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co., No. 152225/2015,
slip op. at 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 11, 2016)).
201. Deochand,slip op. at 2, 5.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 190-201.
203. See infra text accompanying note 204.
204. See infra text accompanying notes 207-16. In the Second Department, it is now clear that,
at a minimum, a bank must prove standing as "a necessary element, when raised, to a valid deacceleration...." Milone v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, No. 100268/15, slip op. at 4 (N.Y. App. Div.
2d Aug. 15, 2018).
205. 58 N.Y.S.3d 118 (App. Div. 2d 2017).
206. See id.
207. Id. at 120.
208. Id. at 121 (internal quotation marks omitted) (first quoting Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n v.
Mebane, 618 N.Y.S.2d 88, 89 (App. Div. 2d 1994); then citing Kashipour v. Wilmington Savs.
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The court in NMNT Realty Corp. did not explain what quantum of

proof would be enough for proving deceleration, 20 9 but more recently,
the Second Department clarified that a stipulation of discontinuance is
not enough. 210 Likewise, to prove that a mortgage was accelerated, many
jurisdictions have only recognized evidence of a "clear and unequivocal"
act as sufficient,21 1 and some New York courts have held the same.2 12
Fund Soc'y, FSB, 41 N.Y.S.3d 738, 739 (App. Div. 2d 2016); then citing Clayton Nat'l, Inc. v.
Guldi, 763 N.Y.S.2d 493, 493-94 (App. Div. 2d 2003); and then citing EMC Mortg. Corp. v.
Patella, 720 N.Y.S.2d 161, 162-63 (App. Div. 2d 2001)).
209. See generally NMNT Realty Corp., 58 N.Y.S.3d 118 (neglecting to specify how an
"affirmative act" of revocation can be proven).
210. Freedom Mortg. Corp. v. Engel, No. 1139/15, 2018 WL 3371696, at *2 (N.Y. App. Div.
2d July 11, 2018) (citing Mebane, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 89-90) (holding that a stipulation of
discontinuance is not enough to prove deceleration where it says nothing about the "revocation of
the election to accelerate, and d[oes] not otherwise indicate that that the plaintiff would accept
installment payments from the defendant"); Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Adrian, No. 506198/14,
2018 WL 635941, at *2 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Jan. 31, 2018) (first citing JBR Constr. Corp. v. Staples,
897 N.Y.S.2d 223, 224 (App. Div. 2d 2010); and then quoting Beneficial Homeowner Serv. Corp.
v. Tovar, 55 N.Y.S.3d 59, 61 (App. Div. 2d 2017)) ("[T]he [lender] ... failed to raise a triable issue
of fact as to whether it affirmatively revoked its election to accelerate the mortgage debt within the
six-year limitations period .... The plaintiff voluntarily discontinued the prior foreclosure action...
after the statute of limitations had expired, and it failed to demonstrate that its... notice, as a matter
of law, 'destroy[ed] the effect of the sworn statement that the plaintiff had elected to accelerate the
maturity of the debt."').
It is still unclear whether a revocation letter can be enough to decelerate a mortgage. See,
e.g., Soroush v. CitiMortgage, Inc., No. 706506/15, 2018 WL 2325222, at *2 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d
May 23, 2018). The Second Department recently refused to recognize such a letter as an
"affirmative act of revocation," but it left open the possibility that a revocation letter may be
sufficient to prove deceleration if the mailing date appears on the face of the letter. Id. Thus, it may
be possible for a lender to avoid the statute of limitations altogether simply by mailing a
deceleration letter to the homeowner just one day prior to the expiration date. See id. Even so, the
Second Department clarified that a deceleration letter cannot be valid if it serves only as a pretext
for circumventing the statute of limitations. See Milone v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, No. 100268/15,
slip op. at 4 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Aug. 15, 2018). As the court explained:
[A] de-acceleration letter is not pretextual if... it contains an express demand for
monthly payments on the note, or, in the absence of such express demand, it is
accompanied by copies of monthly invoices transmitted to the homeowner for
installment payments, or, is supported by other forms of evidence demonstrating that the
lender was truly seeking to de-accelerate and not attempting to achieve another purpose
under the guise of de-acceleration.... In contrast, a "bare" and conclusory deacceleration letter, without a demand for monthly payments toward the note, or copies of
invoices, or other evidence, may raise legitimate questions about whether or not the letter
was sent as a mere pretext to avoid the statute of limitations.
Id. (citing Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. Ams. v. Bernal, 59 N.Y.S.3d 267, 273-74 (Sup. Ct. 2017)).
211. What Amounts to a Sufficient Act, 5 A.L.R.2d 968, 972, § 4 (1949) (listing many cases
from a wide variety ofjurisdictions).
212. See, e.g., Bank of N.Y. v. Hutchinson, No. 501471/2016, 2017 WL 4273201, at *5-6
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Cnty. Sept. 18, 2017) (citing Goldman Sachs Mortg. Co. v. Mares, 23
N.Y.S.3d 444, 445 (App. Div. 3d 2016)). Notably, the Second Department recently applied the
"clear and unambiguous" standard to deceleration notices as well. Milone, slip op. at 4.
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Take for example Goldman Sachs Mortgage Co. v. Mares,213 where the
lender sent a letter to the homeowners informing them that nonpayment
"may result in acceleration of the sums secured by the mortgage."214
' The
Third Department refused to recognize this letter as an election to
accelerate the mortgage because the letter only gave the homeowners
notice of "a possible future event," "fall[ing] far short of providing clear
and unequivocal notice to defendants that the entire mortgage debt was
being accelerated."2 '15
As these cases demonstrate, the issue here is not only whether a
discontinuance or dismissal should be allowed to retroactively reset the
statute of limitations; rather, this question necessarily turns on two
related issues: (1) whether the plaintiffs burden should be the same for
proving deceleration as it is for proving acceleration; and (2) whether the
analysis should depend on the disposition of the initial foreclosure
action.216 To meaningfully address each of these questions, a discussion
of New York's public policy will be instructive.217
IV.

A LEGISLATIVE FIX TO PROTECT HOMEOWNERS AND PROMOTE
GOOD-FAITH LENDING PRACTICES

The statute of limitations would be seriously undermined if the law
were to allow a mortgage to be decelerated solely by the discontinuance
or dismissal of a foreclosure action. 218 The public policy of the State of
New York would be in constant tension with such a rule. 219 Because
there is an absence of controlling authority in New York on the
deceleration issue, litigants are currently faced with unpredictability and

213. 23 N.Y.S.3d at 444.
214. Id. at445.
215. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pidwell v. Duvall, 815 N.Y.S.2d 754, 75657 (App. Div. 3d 2006)); see also Milone, slip op. at 3 (holding that an acceleration letter, which
notified the homeowner that "failure to cure her delenquency within 30 days 'will result in the
acceleration' of the note" fell far short of "clear and unoquivical" evidence that the mortgage debt
was accelerated (emphasis added)); Chase Mortg. Co. v. Fowler, 721 N.Y.S.2d 184, 184 (App. Div.
4th 2001) (explaining that the plaintiff's letter of default to the defendant did not accelerate the
mortgage because it failed to "clearly and unequivocally" inform the defendant that "all sums due
under the note and mortgage were immediately due and payable"). But see Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr.
Co. v. Royal Blue Realty Holdings, Inc., 48 N.Y.S.3d 597, 597 (App. Div. 1st 2017)
(memorandum) (holding that "clear and unequivocal notice" of acceleration was shown by a letter
because it indicated that the bank 'will' accellerate the loan balance and proceed with a foreclosure
sale" (emphasis added)).
216. Both of these questions are addressed infra Part I.B.
217. See infra Part IV.A-B.
218. For a discussion about the purpose of the statute of limitations, see supra Part HI.A.
219. See infra Part W.A.
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uncertainty regarding the outcomes of foreclosure cases. 220 Subpart A
explains the public policy implications of deceleration and concludes
that the policies underlying the statute of limitations-namely
homeowners' and society's interests, in the aggregate-outweigh the
interests of banks and loan servicers in collecting on their debts.22 1
Subpart B then proposes an amendment to Article 13 of New York's
Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law to expressly define the
circumstances when a mortgage may be decelerated.222
A.

The Public Policy Case Against Decelerationof
Mortgages in New York

In the aftermath of the foreclosure crisis, neighborhoods throughout
New York State were blighted with "zombie properties," vacant
properties that were either already foreclosed or had yet to be foreclosed
and which had fallen into disrepair due to a lack of regular
maintenance.2 23 Increases in the amount of vacant homes have been
shown likely to result in corresponding increases in vandalism, which in
turn cause sharp reductions in property values throughout affected
neighborhoods.224 Eventually, this increase-decrease effect culminates in
a further increase in the foreclosure rate.225 In 2016, the New York State
Legislature and Governor Andrew Cuomo sought to address this
"epidemic" by passing comprehensive legislation which imposes new
requirements and strengthens existing requirements on mortgagees, their
agents, and lower court judges.2 26
One component of this legislation is Section 1308 of the Real
Property Actions and Proceedings Law. 227 That statute requires
mortgage servicers to conduct routine exterior inspections of one-to-four
family residential properties within ninety days after the mortgage
becomes delinquent and to conduct follow-up inspections on the
exteriors of those properties every twenty-five to thirty-five days

220. See Greco & Singh, supra note 25; supratext accompanying notes 190-202.
221. See infra Part W.A.
222. See infra Part V.B.
223. 2016 Foreclosure Legislation Home Page, N.Y. ST. DEP'T OF FIN. SERVS.,
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/banking/zombieproplegislation.htm (last updated Dec. 7, 2016); see
Thomas, supranote 73, at 37.
224. See Thomas, supra note 73, at 37; supratext accompanying notes 73-79.
225. See Thomas, supra note 73, at 37; supratext accompanying notes 75-79.
226. 2016 ForeclosureLegislation Home Page,supra note 223.

227. N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1308 (McKinney Supp. 2018); 2016 Foreclosure
LegislationHome Page,supra note 223.
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thereafter. 2 8 Where, based on at least three consecutive inspections, the
servicer has reason to believe the property is vacant or abandoned, the
statute requires the servicer to "post a notice on an easily accessible
portion of the property," in a location where it is likely to be seen by the
homeowner, within seven days after discovering that the property is
likely vacant or abandoned.2 29 If the property owner has not notified the
servicer within seven days after the notice is posted "that the property is
not vacant or abandoned, or if an emergent property condition that could
reasonably damage, destroy or harm the property arises," the servicer is
required to make various repairs to the property, as defined in Section
1308, to prevent any further damage or decay thereto. 3 °
After the plaintiff has conducted the inspections required by
Section 1308, the plaintiff may move the court, pursuant to Section
1309, for an expedited judgment of foreclosure and sale, providing that
several conditions are met.231 First, the plaintiff must show that
defendant has not appeared in court to contest the foreclosure
proceedings and that the defendant's time for filing an answer has
expired. 232 Second, the plaintiff must prove-by photographs, inspection
reports, utility bills, and other documentary evidence-that the property
is vacant and abandoned.233 Third, service of the motion must be made at
the defendant's last known address, and the court must notify the
defendant of the plaintiffs motion and its basis-that the property is
vacant and abandoned-before expedited judgment of foreclosure can
be ordered.2 34 Once the foreclosure and sale have been ordered, the
plaintiff must proceed to auction the property within ninety days of the
judgment.2 35 If the plaintiff purchases the property at the auction, the
plaintiff must then "place the property back on the market for sale or
other occupancy" within 180 days after the deed of sale to the property

228.

REAL PROP. ACTS. § 1308(1).

229.

Id.§ 1308(3); N.Y.S. DEP'T OF FIN. SERVS., INDUSTRY BEST PRACTICES: INSPECTING,

SECURING, AND MAINTAINING VACANT AND ABANDONED PROPERTIES IN NEW YORK 2 (2015),

http://www.dfs.ny.gov/banking/bestpractices-vac abanjproperties_nys.pdf.
230. REAL PROP. ACTS. § 1308(4); see N.Y.S. DEP'T OF FIN. SERVS., supra note 229, at 2-3.
231. REAL PROP. ACTS. § 1309(1); 2016 ForeclosureLegislation Home Page,supra note 223.
232. REAL PROP. ACTS. § 1309(1), (5); see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 320(a) (McKinney 2010)
(requiring an answer or notice of appearance to be served "within twenty days after service of the
summons").
233. REAL PROP. ACTS. § 1309(1)(b); see also Teacher's Fed. Credit Union v. Gergel, No.
615410/2016, 2017 WL 5986454, at *1-2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 1, 2017) (finding that copies of three

inspection reports, photographs of the property, and proof that electricity to the property had been
shut off was sufficient evidence that the property was abandoned and vacant).
234. REAL PROP. ACTS. § 1309(a), (d).
235. Id. § 1351(1); 2016 ForeclosureLegislationHome Page,supra note 223.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol46/iss4/10

28

Nevola: Foreclosure Madness: Using Mortgage Deceleration to Evade the Sta

2018]

FORECLOSUREMADNESS

is executed, or within ninety days after any necessary construction and
renovation to the property is completed, whichever comes first.236
The amount of properties awaiting foreclosure at any given time
can have a serious impact on the rate of vacant properties in New York's
neighborhoods. 237 By allowing for the expedited collection of
outstanding debt, this legislation provides banks with an incentive to
inspect property that may be abandoned or vacant; if it is abandoned or
vacant, to repair and maintain the property; and to provide for the
seamless transition of the property back into the housing market.238
Moreover, by requiring mortgagees to convince the court with
documentary evidence that the property is vacant and abandoned, and by
providing strict notice requirements to avail the homeowner of the
opportunity to appear in court and contest the proceedings, this
legislation also seeks to ensure that expedited judgments will not be had
unless the homeowner truly has relinquished all of their interest in the
property. 239 This legislation does not allow the interests of banks in
collecting on their debts to contravene the interests of homeowners in
remaining in their homes. 24 ' The policy rationales underlying this
legislation can thus be summarized as follows: to curtail the amount of
vacant or abandoned properties in New York's neighborhoods by
facilitating the free alienability of vacant properties; to ensure that those

236. REAL PROP. ACTS. § 1353; 2016 ForeclosureLegislationHome Page,supra note 223.
237. INDEPENDENT DEMOCRATIC CONFERENCE, supra note 44, at 2 ("Many homes become
vacant and abandoned following or in the process of foreclosure."); see also Thomas, supra note 73,
at 37 (noting that foreclosures lead to an increase in vandalism, causing property to depreciate and
the amount of foreclosures to rise); Lin Cui & Randall Walsh, Foreclosure, Vacancy and Crime 25
(Nat'l
Bureau
of
Econ.
Research,
Working
Paper
No.
20593,
2014),
http://www.nber.orglpapers/w20593.pdf ("[P]resence of houses vacant for longer than 6 months
increases violent crime rates, with the impact increasing with duration of vacancy and possibly
plateauing somewhere between 12 and 18 months."); Vacant and Abandoned Properties: Turning
Liabilities into Assets,
U.S.
DEP'T
OF HOUSING
& URB.
DEV.
(2014),
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/periodicals/em/winterl4/highlightl.html ("Both residential and
commercial foreclosures are at high risk of becoming vacant or abandoned."); Post Foreclosure
Timeline
Home
Page,
N.Y.S.
DEP'T
OF
FN.
SERVS.,
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/banking/zombieAproppostfore timeline.htm (last updated Dec. 7, 2016)
(explaining that it takes more than 150 days, on average, for a property to move "from judgment of
foreclosure and sale to auction," and that borrowers are often forced to vacate their homes before
the judgment of foreclosure and sale is even ordered, thereby leaving properties to deteriorate
throughout the foreclosure proceedings).
238. See REAL PROP. ACTS. §§ 1308(1)-(7), 1309(1), 1351, 1353; 2016 Foreclosure
Legislation Home Page, supra note 223.
239. See REAL PROP. ACTS. §§ 1308(3), (4)(j), 1309(1), (5).
240. See id. §§ 1308(3), (4)(j), 1309(1), (5).
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properties are put to the best possible use; and to achieve those
241
objectives while still protecting homeowners from foreclosure.
Society also has an interest in maximizing judicial economy and
lifting the burden foreclosure cases place on judicial resources. 242 Since
the 2008 foreclosure crisis, state courts all over the country have
struggled to find new ways to ease the strain that mass amounts of
foreclosure filings have placed on court dockets. 243 "There is a certain
capacity of judges, of court staff, of clerks, of filing space, of hearing
time, of courtrooms, even of hours in the day. Year in, year out, that
capacity flexes with the caseload traffic to afford reasonable, prompt,
efficient and fair justice."' 2 " New York courts are inundated with 72,000
pending foreclosure cases, and the state government is still searching for
new ways to decrease that number and relieve judges and court
personnel of the enormous burden that comes with adjudicating them.2 45
To avoid the tremendous costs of successive foreclosure proceedings,
courts should be hesitant to allow the revival of defunct foreclosure
cases. 246 If the law were to permit lenders to evade the statute of
limitations by showing only that a prior foreclosure case was voluntarily
discontinued or dismissed, the floodgates would likely swing open-a
great number of foreclosure cases that would otherwise be time-barred
could be heard on their merits-with the expenses ultimately being
subsidized by New York taxpayers. 47
241. See id. §§ 1308(l)-(7), 1309(1), 1351(1), 1353(1); 2016 ForeclosureLegislation Home
Page,supra note 223.
242. See INDEPENDENT DEMOCRATIC CONFERENCE, supra note 44, at 4.

243. Sharon Press, Symposium, Mortgage ForeclosureMediation in Florida-Implementation
Challengesfor an InstitutionalizedProgram, 11 NEV. L.J. 306, 306-07 (2011) (explaining that the
foreclosure crisis has left in its wake an "increased demand for judicial resource[s]" and that courts
are "without any excess capacity to absorb those cases").
244. Id at 306 (quoting TASK FORCE ON RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE CASES, FLA.
SUP. CT., FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE

CASES
4
(2009),
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/pub-info/documents/Filed_08-172009_ForeclosureFinal Report.pdf).
245.

INDEPENDENT DEMOCRATIC CONFERENCE, supra note 44, at 4; supra text accompanying

notes 81, 83-84.
246. See Wachspress et al., supra note 15, at 1121 (describing the courts' reluctance to give
foreclosure cases "preclusive effect").
247. See N.Y. ST. DEP'T OF FIN. SERVS., supra note 151, at 16 (stating that an increased volume
of foreclosure cases results in "congestion in the court system and requires expending more of the
court's already limited resources"); Gregory E. Maggs, Reducing the Costs of Statutory Ambiguity:
Alternative Approaches and the Federal Courts Study Committee, 29 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 123, 123
(1992) ("Although the judicial system exists to resolve society's legal controversies, taxpayers
would need to pay for fewer courts, judges, and court personnel if society had fewer statutory issues
to settle."); Wachspress et al., supra note 15, at 1117 (explaining that 'proof-of-ownership' issues"
have increased "ten-fold" during the time period surrounding the 2007 mortgage meltdown).
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This discussion would be incomplete without considering the
policy underlying the statute of limitations: defendants must be protected
from being made to defend against stale claims.248 If the statute of
limitations were to be made inoperative, homeowners could be made to
wait many months, if not years, sleeplessly waiting to be foreclosed
upon. 249 Those homeowners' right to exclude others from trespassing on
or possessing their property would be made virtually meaningless, at
least inasmuch as that right is applied to mortgage lenders and
servicers.2215° When a second foreclosure action is eventually brought,
homeowners may be unable to effectively defend against what would
251
otherwise be provable usurpations on the part of foreclosing plaintiffs.
By that time, "evidence... [may be] lost, memories... [may have]
faded,... witnesses... [may have] disappeared," and homeowners may

find themselves at an unsurmountable disadvantage. 2
To be sure, lenders do have two arguments weighing in their
favor. 253 First, prohibiting deceleration altogether would preclude banks
from recovering on their debt in cases that are barred by the statute of
limitations.25 4 As the Florida Supreme Court said in Bartram, banks
would have "only one opportunity to enforce the mortgage despite the
occurrence of any future defaults .... '[J]ustice would not be served if
the mortgagee was barred from challenging the subsequent default
255
payment solely because he failed to prove the earlier alleged default.,
While banks do have a strong property interest in the money owed to
them, that interest should not be dispositive on the deceleration
question.256 The court's decision in Bartram was premised on the
borrower's alleged default on an installment payment that occurred after
the dismissal of the prior foreclosure action-a default which could only
248. See Wachspress et al., supra note 15, at 1125 ("Foreclosures ...appear to have
significant effects on community members' physical and mental health, and correlate with increased
rates of depression, anxiety, suicide, cardiovascular disease, and emergency-care treatment."
(footnote omitted)); Holmes, supra note 118, at 477.
249. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3527 (West 2016); ACE Secs. Corp. v. DB Structured Prods., Inc.,
36 N.E.3d 623, 627-28 (N.Y. 2015).
250. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979); TALTY, supra note 122;
Merrill, supranote 121, at 753; supra note 122 and accompanying text.
251. See Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49
(1944); Developments in the Law, supra note 117, at 1185.
252. See Order of R.R. Telegraphers, 321 U.S. at 349; Developments in the Law, supra note
117, at 1185.
253. See infra text accompanying notes 254-69.
254. See Bartram v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 211 So. 3d 1009, 1021 (Fla. 2016).
255. Id.(quoting Singleton v. Greymar Assocs., 882 So. 2d 1004, 1008 (Fla. 2004)).
256. See Bernhard, supra note 22, at 36 (suggesting that homeowners should argue in favor of
a "case-by-case factual analysis of acceleration and deceleration").
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have occurred if the mortgage had been decelerated by said dismissal.2 57
In other words, the court presupposed that the parties were brought back
to the position they were in prior to the acceleration of the mortgage.25 8
Rather than addressing whether a dismissal or a discontinuance should
be enough to decelerate a mortgage, the Bartram court begged the
question and assumed the answer to be in the negative. 2 "9 That is to say
the court failed to adequately address the countervailing policy
considerations discussed above.260
Lenders may also argue that a wholesale rejection of the
deceleration argument would effectively provide foreclosure defendants
with "free" houses.261 While there is a degree of truth to this argument,
its effect may be overstated. 262 Courts have been loath to permit
homeowners to obtain free houses, 263 but such situations can be best
avoided by encouraging lenders to file foreclosure actions sooner rather
than later and to submit the correct documents to the courts, free of any
defects. 64 If lenders were to have advance notice that a discontinuance
or dismissal is not enough to recover a foreclosure action, they would
have more reason to exercise due diligence and act reasonably in their
foreclosure efforts. 65 In addition, homeowners would have more
leverage when negotiating short-sales or mortgage modifications.26 6
Both of these alternatives would likely cost lenders less money as
267 If
opposed to litigating through protracted foreclosure proceedings.
257. Bartram, 211 So. 3d at 1012, 1021-22.
258. Id. at 1023 (Lewis, J., concurring in judgment) (lamenting the majority's failure to explain
how a subsequent default occurred giving rise to a new cause of action, and for neglecting to specify
how a mortgage can be reinstated after an on-the-merits dismissal of a previous foreclosure action).
259. See id. at 1023 (Lewis, J., concurring in judgement).
260. See id. at 1021; supra text accompanying notes 237-52.
261. Wachspress et al., supra note 15, at 1126.
262. See id. at 1126-27 (arguing that "the threat of a 'free house' would have the effect of
incentivizing banks to negotiate with homeowners for mortgage modification agreements or shortsales of their homes).
263. See, e.g., Washington v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC (In re Washington), No. 1414573-TBA, 2014 WL 5714586, at *1 (Bankr. D.N.J. Nov. 5, 2014) ("'No one gets a free house.'
This Court and others have uttered that admonition since the early days of the mortgage crisis,
where homeowners have sought relief under a myriad of state and federal consumer protection
statutes and the Bankruptcy Code."), rev'd, No. 2:14-cv-8063-SDW, 2015 WL 4757924 (D.N.J.
Aug. 11, 2015); Singleton v. Greymar Assocs., 882 So. 2d 1004, 1007-08 (Fla. 2004) (declining to
apply res judicata to preclude a subsequent foreclosure action on the theory that "the mortgagor
would have no incentive to make future timely payments on the note").
264. See Wachspress et al., supra note 15, at 1126.
265. See id.
266. See id.
267. See Eric A. Posner & Luigi Zingales, A Loan Modification Approach to the Housing
Crisis, 11 Am. L. & ECON. REv. 575, 592 (2009).
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this holds true, homeowners would not receive free houses nearly as
much as the argument suggests.268 Instead, judgments of foreclosure
could be avoided altogether, a result which could cause a decrease in the
amount of subprime mortgages extended to borrowers and a greater
likelihood that another financial disaster akin to the 2008 foreclosure
crisis will be averted.26 9
In summary, banks certainly have an interest in recovering on their
debt, but their interests must be balanced against the interest of
homeowners who are facing the imminent risk of homelessness.2 7 °
Procedural safeguards were implemented to provide those homeowners
with greater opportunities to defend themselves against foreclosure.27 1
The risk that those opportunities will be lost through the passage of time
seems great, especially when lenders wait years before commencing
initial foreclosure proceedings.2 72 The law should not protect plaintiffs
who "sleep on their rights" any more than it protects defendants from
losing their homes.2 73 Moreover, society's interest in combatting the
spread of "zombie properties" would be impeded by a rule allowing a
voluntary discontinuance, without more, to operate as a mortgage
deceleration.2 74 If the vacancy rate is elevated, crime rates are more
likely to increase, which may in turn cause property values to
decrease. 275 The end result would be a further increase in the foreclosure
rate, the exact opposite of what the State Legislature intended when it
268. See Wachspress et al., supranote 15, at 1126-27.
269. See Quinn Curtis, State ForeclosureLaws and Mortgage Origination in the Subprime,
49 J. REAL EST. FIN. & EcON. 303, 321 (2013) ("The provisions that make foreclosure easiernonjudicial process and readily available deficiency judgments-lead to increased applications and
accepted applications in the subprime market .... "); Michael H. Schill, An Economic Analysis of
Mortgagor Protection Laws, 77 VA. L. REv. 489, 491 (1991) ("[T]he relatively modest costs
associated with state mortgagor protection laws do suggest that mortgagor protections may indeed
promote economic efficiency."); supra Part Ml.A (explaining how the inclusion of subprime
mortgages in mortgage-backed securities all but guaranteed the mortgage meltdown).
270. Compare Bartram v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 211 So. 3d 1009, 1021 (Fla. 2016), with
Wachspress et al., supranote 15, at 1128, and Ariana Eunjung Cha & Brady Dennis, Under Piles of
Paperwork,A Foreclosure System in Chaos, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 2010, at Al ("[A]s millions of
Americans are being pushed out of the homes they can no longer afford, the foreclosure process is
producing far more paperwork than anyone can read and making it vulnerable to fraud.").
271. See supra text accompanying notes 142-44, 146, 150-52, 234, 239-41; supra notes 145,
149 and accompanying text.
272. See Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49
(1944); Developments in the Law, supra note 117, at 1185.
273. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3527 (West 2016); see supra text accompanying notes 249-52.
274. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
275. See Cui & Walsh, supra note 237, at 27 (concluding that the presence of vacant homes
increases the violent crime rate by roughly nineteen percent within 250 feet surrounding the homes);
Thomas, supra note 73, at 37; supra text accompanying note 73.
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enacted Sections 1308 and 1309 of the Real Property Actions and
Proceedings Law.2 76 Finally, by allowing stale cases to move forward,
notwithstanding the statute of limitations, the ultimate burden would be
placed on the courts' already limited resources. 277 Thus, a rule that
permits a lender to decelerate a mortgage by showing only that a
previous foreclosure action had been discontinued or dismissed would
be inconsistent with the public policy of New York. 278
B. Recommending a StatutoryFix
To date, the New York State Legislature has provided no clarity on
whether a lender's election to accelerate a mortgage can be revoked by
the discontinuance or dismissal of a foreclosure action. 7 9 With a lack of
guidance from the New York Court of Appeals, the lower courts are
sharply divided on this issue, and litigants have no viable way of
predicting whether a voluntary discontinuance may be used to reset the
statute of limitations.2 8 ° Such uncertainty runs counter to the
fundamental principle that the law should provide litigants with advance
notice as to what is expected of them.281
As the New York Appellate Division, Second Department
recognized, the answer to the deceleration question should depend on
whether the prior foreclosure action was voluntarily discontinued or
dismissed.2 82 This would make sense, as the word "election," by
defmition, implies a voluntary act on the part of the lender.283 A
dismissal, on the other hand, is involuntary and thus cannot reasonably
be considered an affirmative act by a lender to revoke its election to
accelerate a mortgage. 284 Allowing an involuntary dismissal to qualify as
276.

Thomas, supra note 73; see 2016 ForeclosureLegislation Home Page, supra note 223.

277. See INDEPENDENT DEMOCRATIC CONFERENCE, supra note 44, at 4; N.Y. ST. DEP'T OF FIN.
SERVS., supra note 151, at 16; wachspress et al., supra note 15, at 1117; supra text accompanying

notes 81, 83-84, 242-47.
278. See supra text accompanying notes 237-52.
279. See BSD 265, LLC v. HSBC Bank USA N.A., No. 504656/16, 2017 WL 2778454, at *7
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 27, 2017).
280. See supra Part III.B.
281. Matthew A. Schwartz, Comment, A Critical Analysis of Retroactive Economic
Legislation: A Proposalfor Due Process Revitalization in the Economic Arena, 9 SETON HALL
CONST. L.J. 935, 972-73 (1999).
282. NMNT Realty Corp. v. Knoxville 2012 Tr., 58 N.Y.S.3d 118, 120-21 (App. Div. 2d
2017).
283. Albertina Realty Co. v. Rosbro Realty Corp., 180 N.E. 176, 177 (N.Y. 1932) ("To elect is
to choose."); Election, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 631 (10th ed. 2014).
284. See Dismissal, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 569 (10th ed. 2014). But cf Bartram v. U.S.
Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 211 So. 3d 1009, 1012 (Fla. 2016) (stating that, under Florida law, "[a]bsent a
contrary provision in the residential note and mortgage," an involuntary dismissal does operate as a
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an "affirmative act" would not only strain the imagination, it would
effectively give courts the ability to, sua sponte, intrude on parties'
freedom of contract.285 Once a lender has elected to exercise its
contractual right to accelerate a mortgage debt, allowing a court's
dismissal to revoke that election would be tantamount to a judicial
arrogation of the lender's contractual rights.286
This Note offers a solution to the deceleration issue that recognizes
the distinction between voluntary discontinuances and involuntary
dismissals. 28 7 This solution provides specific conditions whereby the
former can decelerate a mortgage, 28 8 and it expressly prohibits the latter
from operating as a mortgage deceleration under any circumstance.28 9
To address all the public policy considerations discussed above, and to
provide guidance and certainty to the courts, lenders, and
homeowners, 290 the New York State Legislature should amend
Article 13 of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law to provide
the following:
1. Voluntary discontinuances as revocations of elections to
accelerate mortgages on real property.
(A) A voluntary discontinuance of an action to foreclose on a
mortgage on real property shall not operate as an election or an
affirmative act to revoke the acceleration of that mortgage
unless the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) the option for revoking the acceleration of the mortgage
debt shall have been agreed to by the parties, in a writing signed
by both parties, with or without consideration, prior to the
291
commencement of the foreclosure action;
(ii) a stipulation of discontinuance shall be made between and
signed by the mortgagor and mortgagee and shall be submitted

"revocation of acceleration").
285. See supra text accompanying note 137 (describing how "acceleration" is a lender's
optional exercise of a right guaranteed to the lender by the terms of a mortgage agreement).
286. See supra text accompanying note 137.
287. See infra text accompanying notes 291-96.
288. See infra text accompanying notes 291-96.
289. See infra text accompanying note 297.
290.

See supra Part W.A.

291. This provision would be similar to the requirement that an acknowledgment of an existing
debt or a promise to pay it be in writing in order for that acknowledgment or promise to toll the
statute of limitations. See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 17-101 (Consol. 2006); see also Lee Morris

Demolition Co., Inc. v. Bd. of Ed. of City of N.Y., 355 N.E.2d 369, 371 (N.Y. 1976) (citing Conn.
Tr. & Safe Deposit Co. v. Wead, 65 N.E. 261, 261 (N.Y. 1902)) ("The writing, in order to constitute
an acknowledgment, must recognize an existing debt and must contain nothing inconsistent with an
intention on the part of the debtor to pay it.").
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to the court, which stipulation shall state, and shall contain
nothing inconsistent with, the following language:
"This stipulation of discontinuance is an affirmative act to
revoke the acceleration of the mortgage that is the subject of this
foreclosure action. The mortgage was accelerated on [date of
acceleration], and the mortgage was executed on [date of
mortgage agreement] between [mortgagor] and [mortgagee] in
the principle amount of [dollar amount due under the mortgage
agreement] on a certain premises, known as [mailing address of
the real property secured under the mortgage agreement].
Immediately upon signing this stipulation, [mortgagor] shall
have the right to continue making monthly installment
payments, and [mortgagee] agrees to accept such payments.";292
(iii) the stipulation required by paragraph (A)(ii) of this
subdivision shall provide, at a minimum:
"an explanation, of: (a) when, and by what authority, the
noteholder acquired the note; (b) the authority by which the
servicer [if any] was authorized to act for the noteholder; and
[(c)] the authority by which counsel was authorized to act for
either or both the servicer and the noteholder.";29 3 and
(iv) the statute of limitations for filing a new foreclosure
action with a court of competent jurisdiction on the same
mortgage would continue to accrue if the election to accelerate
the mortgage debt were not revoked.294
(B) For purposes of this subdivision, the statute of limitations
shall be calculated under section two hundred and thirteen of the
Civil Practice Laws and Rules,

295

and shall accrue from the date

designated in section twenty of the General Construction Law.296
292. This language is fully consistent with the Second Department's recent holding that a
stipulation of discontinuance cannot constitute an "affirmative act of revocation" if it is "silent on
the issue of revocation" and does not inform the homeowner of their right to continue making
installment payments. Freedom Mortg. Corp. v. Engel, No. 1139/15, 2018 WL 3371696, at *2 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2d July 11, 2018) (citing Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n v. Mebane, 618 N.Y.S.2d 88, 89-90
(App. Div. 2d 1994)); supra note 210 and accompanying text.
293. This language is taken directly from Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. Americas v.
Bernal, 59 N.Y.S.3d 267, 273 (Sup. Ct. 2017), and is in conformity with the Second Department's
recent holding in Milone v. US. Bank National Ass 'n, No. 100268/15, slip op. at 4 (N.Y. App. Div.
2d Aug. 15, 2018) ("We hold for the first time in the Appellate Division, Second Department, that
just as standing, when raised, is a necessary element to a valid acceleration, it is a necessary
element, when raised, to a valid de-acceleration as well."). For the reasons provided below, there is
sound justification for codifying this language. See infra text accompanying notes 330-31.
294. See EMC Mortg. Corp. v. Patella, 720 N.Y.S.2d 161, 163 (App. Div. 2001) (citing Fed.
Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n v. Mebane, 618 N.Y.S.2d 88, 89 (App. Div. 1994)) (holding that a mortgage
cannot be decelerated after the statute of limitations for filing a new foreclosure action has expired).
295. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213 (McKinney 2003) (providing for a six-year statute of limitations).
296. N.Y.GEN. CONSTR. LAW § 20 (McKinney 2009). The statute of limitations accrues on the
day after the date when the action is filed. Id. ("The day from which any specified period of time is
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2. Involuntary dismissals as revocations of elections to
accelerate mortgages on real property. An involuntary dismissal
of an action to foreclose on a mortgage on real property shall not
operate as an election or an affirmative act to revoke the
acceleration of that mortgage, nor shall an involuntary dismissal
of an action to foreclose on a mortgage on real property be
construed as evidence of an election or affirmative act in favor
of the revocation of the acceleration of that mortgage.2 97
There are several important points of this proposed statute worth
expounding.2 98 First, subparagraph (A)(i) of subdivision 1 is necessary if
this statute is to be consistent with section 17-101 of the General
Obligations Law. 2 9 9 Section 17-101 requires a promise to be "in a
writing" before that promise can "take an action out of the operation of
the" statute of limitations, and subparagraph (A)(i) requires the same.300
The inclusion of this requirement would leave a court with no doubts
that both parties clearly and unequivocally agreed that a revocation of
acceleration may be effectuated by option of the mortgagee.3 1 Second,
subparagraph (A)(i) would ensure that the homeowner is placed on
notice of the possibility that an acceleration might be revoked, while

reckoned shall be excused in making the reckoning."); Greco v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 16-CV2196 (AMD), 2017 WL 1483524, at *3-5 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2017) (applying section twenty of the
New York General Construction Law and holding that the date of filing is excluded from the
calculation of the statute of limitations, that the statute of limitations expired one day after the
bank's notice of deceleration was mailed, and that said notice was therefore timely).
297. Kashipour v. Wilmington Savs. Fund Soc'y, FSB, 41 N.Y.S.3d 738, 739 (App. Div. 2016)
(citing EMC Mortg. Corp., 720 N.Y.S.2d at 162-63) (holding that a dismissal of a foreclosure action
"d[oes] not constitute an affirmative act" of revocation). This proposed legislation would be a novel
development in New York law, as neither the courts nor the legislature have expressly defined the
exact circumstances where a voluntary discontinuance can decelerate a mortgage (the courts have
only generally addressed whether a voluntary discontinuance can decelerate a mortgage and have
split on that issue). See supra Part HI.B. For the reasons explained supra Part W.A., this statute
would assist the State as it attempts to respond to the effects of the foreclosure crisis and prevent its
resurgence. If this statute were enacted, it would make the most sense for a Section 1350 of the Real
Property Actions and Proceedings Law to be created for its codification. See generally N.Y. REAL
PROP. ACTS. LAW § 1351 (McKinney 2009) (providing rules applicable where a judgment of
foreclosure sale is rendered). Section 1350 can be titled "Revocations of Elections to Accelerate
Mortgages on Real Property."
298. See infra text accompanying notes 299-317.
299. See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
300. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 17-101 (Consol. 2006); supra note 292 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 211-15 and accompanying text (explaining that courts in other
jurisdictions and some courts in New York have held the standard for proving revocation to be
"clear and unequivocal" evidence, and that in New York, "clear and unequivocal" evidence is the
standard for proving acceleration).
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subparagraph (A)(ii) would guarantee the homeowner notice that the
acceleration is being revoked.3 °2
In the pursuit of clarity, subparagraphs (A)(ii) and (iii) go a step
further by enumerating the exact language that must be contained in a
stipulation of discontinuance before one can be made to decelerate a
mortgage.3 °3 This would be a useful substitute of the vague "affirmative
act" requirement. 3 4 The latter standard, as it is currently employed,
leaves the courts to inject their own definition of "affirmative act" into a
case-by-case analysis. 3 5 This invariably leads to uncertainties and
inconsistencies among both courts and litigants.30 6 By providing a
precise framework for how a stipulation of discontinuance must be
drafted, these provisions would guarantee that trivial issues (e.g.,
determining the parties' intent, if the homeowner properly agreed to the
deceleration, whether notice of the deceleration was properly conveyed
to the homeowner, and if the lender or its agent had the authority to
decelerate) would no longer be litigated-at least where a voluntary
discontinuance is said to have revoked a mortgage acceleration. 30 7 This
could save litigants an appreciable amount of time and money in motion
practice, and it could save the courts time and money in the judicial
resources that are necessary to answer such questions.30 8 The recent
disagreements among the lower courts on whether a voluntary
discontinuance constitutes an "affirmative act" illustrate the need for
such clarity.30 9
Subparagraph (A)(iv) is perhaps the most important for purposes of
this Note.310 Once enacted, it would ensure that lenders exercise their
302. See supra notes 291-92 and accompanying text.
303. See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
304. Compare NMNT Realty Corp. v. Knoxville 2012 Tr., 58 N.Y.S.3d 118, 120-21 (App.
Div. 2017) (citing Kashipour v. Wilmington Says. Fund Soc'y, FSB, 41 N.Y.S.3d 738, 739 (App.
Div. 2016)) (holding that a dismissal is not an "affirmative act" of revocation, but stopping short of
clarifying whether a voluntary discontinuance is an "affirmative act"), with Freedom Mortg. Corp.
v. Engel, No. 1139/15, 2018 WL 3371696, at *2 (N.Y. App. Div. July 11, 2018) (holding that a
voluntary discontinuance is not an "affirmative act" of revocation where the stipulation of
discontinuance makes no mention of the lender's intent to revoke the mortgage acceleration and
fails to indicate whether the lender will continue to accept monthly installment payments from the
homeowner).
305. See, e.g., NMNT Realty Corp., 58 N.Y.S.3d at 121; Freedom Mortg. Corp., 2018 WL
3371696, at *2.
306. See supra Part IlI.B (discussing various cases that are inconsistent as to whether a
voluntary discontinuance of a foreclosure action constitutes an "affirmative act" of revocation).
307. See Maggs, supra note 247, at 123 ("Ambiguous statutes hinder planning, promote
litigation, confound judicial decision-making, and impose a variety of other costs on society.").
308. See id. at 126-27.
309. See supra Part HI.B.
310. See supra Parts HI.A-IV.A; supra text accompanying note 294.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol46/iss4/10

38

Nevola: Foreclosure Madness: Using Mortgage Deceleration to Evade the Sta

2018]

FORECLOSUREMADNESS

options to revoke accelerations before the statute of limitations has
expired, and it would encourage the prompt filing of foreclosure actions
311
and the submission of complete and accurate documents to the courts.
Lenders, loan servicers, and their agents would know or have reason to
know that waiting to file a foreclosure action would increase the risk that
a voluntary discontinuance, should one come to pass, will occur after the
statute of limitations has expired. 3 2 To avoid having successive
foreclosure actions dismissed as time-barred, lenders would be
encouraged to submit complete and accurate documents to a court in the
first instance, including the mortgage, the note, copies of all assignments
of the note, together with copies of all documents showing that the
assignors had the power of attorney to make such assignments. 31 3 If all
the necessary documentation is submitted in a timely fashion, a case
would not be discontinued or dismissed for the lender's inability to
prove standing.314 The result would be an increase in efficiency, leading
to less time spent by lenders and homeowners litigating successive
foreclosure actions and less time spent by the courts adjudicating
them.315 Finally, to ensure that these objectives are met, paragraph (B)
would leave no ambiguity as to how the statute of limitations is to be
calculated; it simply provides that the statute of limitations is to be
calculated in the same manner as it would be for any other action
3 16
sounding in foreclosure.
It must be emphasized that subdivision 1 would only be operative
in cases where a voluntary discontinuance is alleged to have revoked a
mortgage acceleration; it would be inapplicable to cases where an
acceleration is said to have been revoked by some other means.317
311. See Wachspress et al., supra note 15, at 1127 (suggesting that, by using res judicata to bar
banks from commencing successive foreclosure actions on the same mortgage, banks would be
incentivized "to act in their own long-term interest"); supra note 294 and accompanying text.
312. Because the language of this statute is unambiguous, lenders would know or have reason
to know what is expected of them. See supra note 307 and accompanying text.
313. See Wachspress et al., supra note 15, at 1126.
314. See, e.g., In re Mims, 438 B.R. 52, 56-57 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010); Aurora Loan Servs.,
LLC v. Taylor, 34 N.E.3d 363, 366 (N.Y. 2015); U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Dellarmo, 942 N.Y.S.2d 122,
124 (App. Div. 2012); U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Merino, 836 N.Y.S.2d 853, 855 (Sup. Ct. 2007);
Indymac Bank v. Bethley, No. 9615/08, 2009 WL 279304, at *3 (Sup. Ct. Feb. 6, 2009).
315. See Maggs, supra note 247, at 127; Wachspress et al., supra note 15, at 1126-27
(explaining that barring successive foreclosure actions is likely to encourage lenders to "look
favorably upon loan renegotiation" and to "provide[] leverage to homeowners to negotiate a
voluntary settlement, whether through a modification or a 'graceful exit' like a short sale" (internal
quotation marks omitted) (footnotes omitted)).
316. See N.Y. GEN. CONSTR. LAW § 20 (McKinney 2009); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(4) (McKinney
2018); Greco v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 16-CV-2196 (AMD), 2017 WL 1483524, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.
Apr. 25, 2017); Saini v. Cincelli Enters., Inc., 733 N.Y.S.2d 824, 826 (App. Div. 2001).
317. See supra text accompanying note 291.
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Although the Second Department has held that lenders cannot exercise
their option to revoke a mortgage acceleration by a letter to the
homeowner after the statute of limitations has expired, 3 18 codification of
this rule would help to ensure that homeowners' property interests are
properly safeguarded. 319 The Legislature can provide this assurance
while striving to achieve its public policy objectives by further amending
Article 13 of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law as follows:
3. Revocations of elections to accelerate mortgages on real
property.
(A) A revocation of an election to accelerate a mortgage on
real property shall be ineffective unless the following conditions
are satisfied:
(i) the option for revoking the acceleration of the mortgage
a writing signed
debt shall have been agreed to by the parties, in
320
by both parties, with or without consideration;
(ii) a written notice shall be made by the mortgagee to the
mortgagor, informing the mortgagor of the mortgagee's election
to revoke the acceleration of the mortgage, which notice shall
state, and shall contain nothing inconsistent with, the following
language:
"This notice is an affirmative act by [mortgagee] to revoke the
acceleration of the mortgage agreement. The mortgage was
accelerated on [date of acceleration], and the mortgage was
executed on [date of mortgage agreement] between you and
[mortgagee] in the principle amount of [dollar amount due under
the mortgage agreement] on a certain premises, known as
[mailing address of the real property secured under the mortgage
agreement]. At this time, you have the right to continue making
and [mortgagee] is willing to
monthly installment payments,
321
payments.";
accept such
(iii) the notice required by paragraph (A)(ii) of this
subdivision shall provide, at a minimum:
"an explanation, of: (a) when, and by what authority, the
318. See EMC Mortg. Corp. v. Patella, 720 N.Y.S.2d 161, 162-63 (App. Div. 2d 2001)
(holding that an "affirmative act" by the lender could have been sufficient to revoke its election to
accelerate but for its failure to do so within the six-year statute of limitations); Fed. Nat'l Mortg.
Ass'n v. Mebane, 618 N.Y.S.2d 88, 89 (App. Div. 2d 1994) (same).
319. See Maggs, supra note 247, at 126-30 (identifying many of the consequences of
ambiguity in statutory language); supra Parts II.B-IV.A.
320. See supra note 291.
321. See Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. Ams. v. Bemal, 59 N.Y.S.3d 267, 274-75 (Sup. Ct.
2017) (holding that the lender's notice of revocation was ineffective because, inter alia, the notice
failed to let the borrower know that future installment payments could be made and would be
accepted); supra note 291.
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noteholder acquired the note; (b) the authority by which the
servicer [if any] was authorized to act for the noteholder; and
[(c)] the authority by which [the signor of the notice] ...was
authorized to act for either or both the servicer and the
noteholder.";3 22 and
(iv) the statute of limitations for filing a new foreclosure
action with a court of competent jurisdiction on the same
the election to accelerate
mortgage would continue to accrue 3 if
23
the mortgage debt were not revoked.
(B) For purposes of this subdivision, the statute of limitations
shall be calculated under section two hundred and thirteen of the
Civil Practice Laws and Rules, 3 24 and shall accrue from the date
325
designated in section twenty of the General Construction Law.
(C) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, this
subdivision shall not be applicable to discontinuances and
dismissals32 6 of actions to foreclose on mortgages on real
property.
Subdivision 3 mostly parallels subdivision 1, except for two minor
differences.327 Most notably, subdivision 3 would apply not to cases
involving voluntary discontinuances but to all other cases where
deceleration is attempted.3 28 It would also require a notice to be made to
the homeowner in lieu of a stipulation to discontinue a foreclosure
action. 32 9 Aside from these two differences, subdivision 3 is substantially
the same as subdivision 1; both subdivisions require notice that clearly
explains: (1) how the lender or its agent has the authority to revoke the
acceleration of the mortgage; and (2) that the homeowner is entitled to
continue making installment payments which the mortgagee will
accept.330 Without this information, the homeowner could not, in any
real sense, be placed in the same position as they were in prior to the
322. Bernal, 59 N.Y.S.3d at 273; see Milone v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, No. 100268/15, slip op.
at 4 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Aug. 15, 2018); infra text accompanying notes 330-3 1.
323. This provision would codify existing common law principles to ensure that no
revocations, no matter how they are made, will be effective if they are made after the statute of
limitations for filing a foreclosure action has expired. See supra notes 193, 318 and
accompanying text.
324. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213 (McKinney 2003).
325. N.Y. GEN. CONSTR. LAW § 20 (McKinney 2009).
326. This paragraph would ensure that subdivision 3 is not construed as inconsistent in any
way with subdivisions 1 and 2. See supra text accompanying notes 291-97.
327. See infra text accompanying notes 328-30; supra text accompanying notes 291-92.
328. See supra text accompanying notes 320, 326.
329. See supra text accompanying note 321.
330. See Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. Ams. v. Bernal, 59 N.Y.S.3d 267, 273-74 (Sup. Ct.
2017); supratext accompanying notes 291-96; supra note 322 and accompanying text.
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mortgage acceleration; they would have no way of knowing whether the
revocation is valid, and they may be left completely unaware of their
331
option to continue making mortgage payments.
Taken as a whole, subdivisions 1 and 3 would foreclose lenders'
ability to use the deceleration of a mortgage as a means of bypassing the
statute of limitations.332 After the statute of limitations for filing a
foreclosure action has expired, homeowners would have the
unencumbered right to quiet title to their property, sell or transfer
ownership of their property to a third party, and provide for their
property's occupancy and upkeep.333 To be sure, homeowners would
receive "free" houses, but only after banks have "sle[pt] on their
rights."33' 4 The inevitability of this outcome would encourage lenders to
properly and promptly foreclose on property while they have the chance
to do so.335 Insofar as lenders choose to act timely, reasonably, and with
due diligence, they would remain free to collect on any debt owed to
them.336 In short, homeowners' property rights would be protected and
the alienability of property would be facilitated, all without impinging
on lenders' interest in collecting on their debt.337
For the foregoing reasons, the New York State Legislature should
codify this proposed legislation and settle the conflict among the lower
338
courts once and for all.

V.

CONCLUSION

Due to the improprieties that were all too common in the mortgage
industry in the years leading up to the financial crisis, a substantial
number of foreclosure cases were unable to hold their weight in court,
because, under the law, they were baseless, meritless, factually
unfounded, tainted with fraud and malpractice, and had to be
dismissed.33 9 Lenders' motivations for attempting to revive these cases
331. Seeid. at274.
332. See supra notes 294, 323 and accompanying text.
333. N.Y. REALPROP. ACTS. LAW § 1501(4) (McKinney 2009).
334. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3527 (West 2016).
335. See Wachspress et al., supra note 15, at 1127.
336. See, e.g., Greco v. Bank of Am., No. 16-CV-2196, 2017 WL 1483524, at *1,*34, *6
(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2017) (granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissing
the complaint in a quiet title action on the grounds that, inter alia, the defendant's notice of
revocation was timely mailed to the plaintiff and the statute of limitations for filing a new
foreclosure action had not yet expired).
337. See REAL PROP. ACTS. § 1501(4); Larsen, supra note 177; supra text accompanying notes
175-80.
338. See supra Part IV.A; supra text accompanying notes 291-97, 320-26.
339. See supra Parts I.B; supra text accompanying notes 163-73; supra note 168.
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are understandable; they simply wish to recover the money they were
owed.3 40 However, the interests of property owners, the state court
system, and New York's citizenry significantly outweigh lenders'
pecuniary interests.341 The people of New York-including the tens of
thousands who have already lost their homes to foreclosure as well the
over 100,000 who are still awaiting foreclosure 42---deserve legislative
action to ensure that abandoned houses will not continue to blight their
neighborhoods; that their homes will not continue to await foreclosure
ad infinitum; that the free transfer of property will not be unduly
hindered; and perhaps most importantly, that the effects of the
3 43
foreclosure crisis will be a thing of the past and will linger no longer.
Nor should those lenders responsible for contributing to the foreclosure
crisis be rewarded for their improper behavior with a rule allowing them
to evade the statute of limitations. 3" If such a rule were to gain uniform
recognition across New York, there would be little incentive for those
lenders to reform their policies and procedures and take better
care in their issuance of and foreclosure on mortgages, lest history
3 45

repeat itself.
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